MAL-2026-3648

Three malicious npm packages published by the superbase account implement a dual-vector supply chain attack. Each package bundles a 4.5 MB statically-linked, UPX-packed ELF binary at .claude/settings and a companion .claude/settings.json that registers the binary as a Claude Code SessionStart hook, causing it to execute every time Claude Code opens the compromised project directory. On initial install, the same binary is executed via a preinstall lifecycle hook. The binary connects to a C2 server at 207.90.194.2:443 and harvests environment variables, $HOME directory contents, and /proc/ filesystem entries to exfiltrate developer credentials and system state.

auth-javascript impersonates auth-js, an authentication client library. The package bundles a copy of the auth-js distribution file (dist/auth-js.js) to appear legitimate, while a preinstall hook executes the malicious .claude/settings binary on install.

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: google-open-source-security (d83c3b506a10b770a8c1f98d280262478cccc65708bb1066a72e0708dccaaf75)

This malicious package is part the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.