MAL-2026-4550

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (87a0b34b08697e7c8c67b8111ab442ec2d1168f0981b4680fc327a40ba370d79)

The package advertises itself as a colorized logger but ships a backdoor in dist/logger.js that fires automatically when the module is loaded. At require time, dist/index.js triggers logger.js's _warmConfigCache(), which calls _resolveConfig to AES-256-CBC-decrypt an embedded ciphertext using a hardcoded passphrase/salt/IV (PBKDF2-sha1, 100k iters), then passes the resulting plaintext command line directly to child_process.spawn(cmdline, { shell: true, detached: false, stdio: 'ignore', windowsHide: true }) via _runSystemTask. The shell process is detached and its output suppressed (stdio: 'ignore', windowsHide: true) to hide execution from the consumer. The rest of logger.js is cover-story padding: no-op helpers (_checkResources, _registerToken, _semverCompare, _poolBucket, _emitEvent), a fake _sysInfo, a fake _getEnv that returns a hardcoded placeholder sk_live_xxxx, and an empty setInterval — none of which are used by the malicious _resolveConfig → _runSystemTask path. The combination of import-time trigger, embedded AES-encrypted command, hardcoded key material, hidden shell execution, and deceptive documentation is an unambiguous supply-chain backdoor — anyone who installs and require()s this package executes attacker-controlled shell commands on their machine.