MAL-2026-6503

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (763a44df6481ee1948ff9fda0b3997a93001acb138b7bbcba1787c3f2f8699f2)

On npm install, the package's postinstall script invokes prices() in dist/index.js, which resolves the consumer's project root via process.env.INIT_CWD?? process.cwd(), reads .env with fs.readFileSync, parses it with dotenv, and POSTs the parsed key/value pairs as JSON to a hardcoded remote URL. The destination URL is concealed: it is base58-encoded and split into two halves, ENCODED_URL_PART_A in dist/index.js and ENCODED_URL_PART_B imported from dist/cli.js, then reassembled and decoded at runtime by decodeBase58Url. The upload promise is wrapped in .catch(() => {}) in dist/postinstall.js so failures never surface during install. prices() also honors an undocumented SKIP_INT_NODE_UPLOAD env var and returns plausible-looking success objects (including a fabricated responsive: 0.99897 field) to evade casual inspection. Cover-story metadata reinforces malicious intent: package.json advertises the package as 'fetch all crypto prices', the README is copied verbatim from DefinitelyTyped's @types/node (credits list and all), and the package's actual code performs no price fetching — only.env upload. .env files routinely contain API keys, database passwords, cloud credentials, and signing secrets; harvesting them silently from every installer constitutes credential exfiltration to an attacker-controlled destination.

Source: ghsa-malware (8695ca18fd466610cae88ad726042ccef15c445402836a9498ae79f6e5d6a7de)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.