MAL-2026-6767

The @marketfront/basemarkettemplate package is part of a 25-package malicious campaign batch-published to the @marketfront npm scope by npm user 'marketfront' (marketfront@tutamail.com) within a roughly 3-minute window on 2026-07-01. All packages in the campaign were published at version 7.0.0 and use e-commerce/marketing frontend component names as cover.

The package declares a postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) that executes heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style) code automatically at npm install time. Static analysis of the decoded payload revealed a credential harvester that dynamically requires fs, os, http, https, zlib, path and dns, then reads approximately 20 sensitive credential files including ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.pgpass, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.env and ~/.bash_history. Collected data is exfiltrated via a gzip-compressed HTTPS POST with a custom X-Secret header to the path /api/v1/events, alongside a DNS resolver beacon. The command-and-control host is concealed behind an additional RC4+XOR encryption layer around an embedded configuration blob and was not statically resolved.

The decoded behavioral payload (module requires, credential-file target list, exfiltration headers and endpoint) is byte-for-byte identical across sampled packages in the campaign. The campaign shares tooling and infrastructure patterns (obfuscated postinstall credential harvester, X-Secret header, /api/v1/events exfiltration path, RC4-concealed C2) with the earlier @emcd-vue campaign, indicating the same actor rotating scopes and disposable maintainer emails.

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Source: amazon-inspector (66d3e4ea5397dbe076b14c24ec39301f31e7c1c3587b3aa98a1cadb9f3e89aa7)

The package ships an obfuscated scripts/postinstall.js (RC4 + shuffled string-array obfuscation, NODEOPTIONS/argv inspector-flag check, random startup delay) that npm runs automatically on install via package.json's postinstall: node scripts/postinstall.js hook. When executed, the decoded payload collects host identifiers (hostname, username, homedir, platform, npmconfiguseragent), Windows environment variables (USERDOMAIN, COMPUTERNAME, APPDATA, LOCALAPPDATA, TEMP, PROGRAMDATA), and reads installer-owned secret files the package never wrote — shell history (.bashhistory,.zshhistory), ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.netrc, and browser profile directories — using readFileSync/readdirSync helpers over byte-array-decoded path strings. The collected data is JSON-serialized, XOR-encrypted, and transmitted over two channels: an HTTPS POST to a runtime-selected hostname, and a DNS-tunnel that base32-encodes the payload into subdomain labels resolved via node's dns module. The package is scoped @marketfront/* and presents itself as an internal HTTP client with fabricated corporate URLs (github.marketfront.io, jira.marketfront.io) and private: false — the classic dependency-confusion shape targeting an organization that uses that scope internally. No real library functionality is shipped; the package is a pure delivery vehicle for the postinstall payload.