OESA-2026-3205

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.

Security Fix(es):

Arm C1-Ultra, C1-Premium, Neoverse V3 & V3AE, Neoverse V2, Neoverse V1, Neoverse-N2, Neoverse-N1, Cortex-X925, Cortex-X4, Cortex-X3, Cortex-X2, Cortex-X1 & X1C, Cortex-A710, Cortex-A78, A78AE & A78C, Cortex-A77, Cortex-A76 & A76A may allow writes to resources owned by a higher exception level.(CVE-2025-10263)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: ac97: fix a double free in snd_ac97_controller_register()

If ac97_add_adapter() fails, put_device() is the correct way to drop the device reference. kfree() is not required. Add kfree() if idr_alloc() fails and in ac97_adapter_release() to do the cleanup.

Found by code review.(CVE-2025-71192)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

can: ems_usb: ems_usb_read_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak

Fix similar memory leak as in commit 7352e1d5932a ("can: gs_usb: gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak").

In ems_usb_open(), the URBs for USB-in transfers are allocated, added to the dev->rx_submitted anchor and submitted. In the complete callback ems_usb_read_bulk_callback(), the URBs are processed and resubmitted. In ems_usb_close() the URBs are freed by calling usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->rx_submitted).

However, this does not take into account that the USB framework unanchors the URB before the complete function is called. This means that once an in-URB has been completed, it is no longer anchored and is ultimately not released in ems_usb_close().

Fix the memory leak by anchoring the URB in the ems_usb_read_bulk_callback() to the dev->rx_submitted anchor.(CVE-2026-23058)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

locking/rtmutex: Skip remove_waiter() when waiter is not enqueued

syzbot triggered the following splat in remove_waiter() via FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI:

KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000a88-0x0000000000000a8f] class_raw_spinlock_constructor remove_waiter+0x159/0x1200 kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:1561 rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock+0x103/0x120 futex_requeue+0x10e4/0x20d0 __x64_sys_futex+0x34f/0x4d0

task_blocks_on_rt_mutex() does not arm the waiter upon deadlock detection, leaving waiter->task nil, where 3bfdc63936dd ("rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()") made this fatal.

Furthermore, rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() should not be calling into remove_waiter() upon a successfully grabbing the rtmutex. 1a1fb985f2e2 ("futex: Handle early deadlock return correctly"), moved the remove_waiter() out of __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() (where 'ret' was only ever 0 or < 0) into the wrapper. Tighten this check to account for try_to_take_rt_mutex().(CVE-2026-53163)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

USB: serial: omninet: fix memory corruption with small endpoint

Make sure that the bulk-out buffers are at least as large as the hardcoded transfer size to avoid user-controlled slab corruption should a malicious device report a smaller endpoint max packet size than expected.(CVE-2026-63928)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

security/keys: fix missed RCU read section on lookup

Nicholas Carlini reports that the keyring code calls assoc_array_find() in find_key_to_update() without holding the RCU read lock, while the assoc_array_gc() code really is designed around removing the node from the tree and then freeing it after an RCU grace-period.

The regular key handling doesn't see this because holding the keyring semaphore hides any lifetime issues, but the persistent key handling uses a different model.

Instead of extending the keyring locking, just do the simple RCU locking that the assoc_array was designed for.(CVE-2026-64015)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xfs: resample the data fork mapping after cycling ILOCK

xfs_reflink_fill_{cow_hole,delalloc} are both presented with an inode, a data fork mapping, and a cow fork mapping. Unfortunately, these two helpers cycle the ILOCK to grab a transaction, which means that the mappings are stale as soon as we reacquire the ILOCK. Currently we refresh the cow fork mapping by re-calling xfs_find_trim_cow_extent, but we don't refresh the data fork mapping beforehand, which means that the xfs_bmap_trim_cow in that function queries the refcount btree about the wrong physical blocks and returns an inaccurate value in *shared.

If *shared is now false, the directio write proceeds with a stale data fork mapping. Fix this by querying the data fork mapping if the sequence counter changes across the ILOCK cycle.(CVE-2026-64600)