The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.
Security Fix(es):
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
seg6: separate dst_cache for input and output paths in seg6 lwtunnel
The seg6 lwtunnel uses a single dst_cache per encap route, shared between seg6_input_core() and seg6_output_core(). These two paths can perform the post-encap SID lookup in different routing contexts (e.g., ip rules matching on the ingress interface, or VRF table separation). Whichever path runs first populates the cache, and the other reuses it blindly, bypassing its own lookup.
Fix this by splitting the cache into cache_input and cache_output, so each path maintains its own cached dst independently.(CVE-2026-31668)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix iova-to-va conversion for MR page sizes != PAGE_SIZE
The current implementation incorrectly handles memory regions (MRs) with page sizes different from the system PAGE_SIZE. The core issue is that rxe_set_page() is called with mr->page_size step increments, but the page_list stores individual struct page pointers, each representing PAGE_SIZE of memory.
ib_sg_to_page() has ensured that when i>=1 either a) SG[i-1].dma_end and SG[i].dma_addr are contiguous or b) SG[i-1].dma_end and SG[i].dma_addr are mr->page_size aligned.
This leads to incorrect iova-to-va conversion in scenarios:
page_size < PAGE_SIZE (e.g., MR: 4K, system: 64K): ibmr->iova = 0x181800 sg[0]: dma_addr=0x181800, len=0x800 sg[1]: dma_addr=0x173000, len=0x1000
Access iova = 0x181800 + 0x810 = 0x182010 Expected VA: 0x173010 (second SG, offset 0x10) Before fix:
page_size > PAGE_SIZE (e.g., MR: 64K, system: 4K): ibmr->iova = 0x18f800 sg[0]: dma_addr=0x18f800, len=0x800 sg[1]: dma_addr=0x170000, len=0x1000
Access iova = 0x18f800 + 0x810 = 0x190010 Expected VA: 0x170010 (second SG, offset 0x10) Before fix:
Yi Zhang reported a kernel panic[1] years ago related to this defect.
Solution:
This ensures correct iova-to-va conversion regardless of MR page size and system PAGE_SIZE relationship, while improving performance through array-based sequential access.
Tests on 4K and 64K PAGE_SIZE hosts:
In the Linux kernel, compat_riscv_gpr_set() calls cregs_to_regs() unconditionally, even when user_regset_copyin() fails. Since cregs is an uninitialized stack variable, a copyin failure causes uninitialized stack data to be written into the target task's pt_regs, corrupting its register state and potentially leaking kernel stack contents. compat_restore_sigcontext() has the same issue: it calls cregs_to_regs() even when __copy_from_user() fails, leading to the same corruption of the signal-returning task's register state on error.(CVE-2026-64082)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit
handshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing req->hr_sk->sk_socket to survive the window between handshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file(). The submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that. sk_refcnt keeps struct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock->file: when the consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears the socket down regardless of any sock_hold.
Add an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an explicit reference on sock->file during handshake_req_submit(). handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the reference on the completion-bit-winning path.
The submit error path must also release the file reference, but after rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can discover the request and race the error path. Gate the error-path cleanup -- sk_destruct restoration, fput, and request destruction -- with test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED), the same serialization handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() already use. When cancel has already claimed ownership, the submit error path returns without touching the request; socket teardown handles final destruction.
The accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change comes in the next patch.(CVE-2026-64523)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers()
decode_lockers() in cls_lock_client.c contains two bare decode operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger slab-out-of-bounds reads:
ceph_decode_32(p) at the num_lockers field has no preceding bounds check. ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0 as valid -- the internal ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes -- so when an OSD sends struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end. The immediately following bare ceph_decode_32(p) then reads 4 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as the locker count.
The sibling function decode_watchers() in osd_client.c already uses ceph_decode_32_safe() after its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_lockers() was the only site using the bare variant.
ceph_decode_8(p) after the decode_locker() loop has no preceding bounds check. If an OSD crafts num_lockers such that the loop advances p exactly to end, the subsequent bare ceph_decode_8(p) reads one byte past the validated buffer boundary. The result is passed directly into *type, which is used as a lock type discriminator by callers, giving an OSD-controlled one-byte OOB read with direct influence over the lock type field.
Fix both by replacing bare operations with their safe variants: ceph_decode_32(p) -> ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_lockers, err_inval) ceph_decode_8(p) -> ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, *type, err_free_lockers)
The goto targets differ intentionally: err_inval: is a new label returning -EINVAL directly. It is used for the pre-allocation failure path where *lockers is not yet allocated and must not be passed to ceph_free_lockers().
err_free_lockers: is the existing label. It is used for the post-allocation failure path where *lockers is allocated and must be freed.
ret is set to -EINVAL before ceph_decode_8_safe() so that err_free_lockers returns the correct error code on bounds violation. Without this, err_free_lockers would return a stale ret value (0 from the successful decode_locker() loop), silently swallowing the error.
-EINVAL is correct for both failure paths. The data received from the OSD is structurally malformed. -ENOMEM would misrepresent the failure class to callers and to stable@ backporters triaging error paths.
Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition).
idryomov: trim changelog, formatting
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: gro: fix double aggregation of flush-marked skbs
Commit 0ab03f353d36 ("net-gro: Fix GRO flush when receiving a GSO packet.") added a flush check to skb_gro_receive(), but skb_gro_receive_list() lacks the same validation.
As a result, packets marked with NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush may still be re-aggregated.
This allows already-GRO'd packets with existing frag_list to be re-aggregated into a new GRO session, corrupting the frag_list chain structure. When skb_segment() attempts to unpack these malformed packets, it encounters invalid state and triggers a kernel panic.
Scenario (Tethering/Device forwarding):
Root cause in skb_segment(): The check at line ~4891: if (hsize <= 0 && i >= nfrags && skb_headlen(list_skb) && (skb_headlen(list_skb) == len || sg)) {
When frag_list is corrupted by double aggregation, when list_skb is a NULL pointer from skb->next, skb_headlen(list_skb) dereference NULL/corrupted pointers occurs.
Call Trace: skb_headlen(NULL skb) skb_segment tcp_gso_segment tcp4_gso_segment inet_gso_segment skb_mac_gso_segment __skb_gso_segment skb_gso_segment validate_xmit_skb validate_xmit_skb_list sch_direct_xmit qdisc_restart __qdisc_run qdisc_run net_tx_action
Fix: Add NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush validation to the early-return check in skb_gro_receive_list(), matching the defensive programming pattern of skb_gro_receive().(CVE-2026-68136)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: bound pg_{temp,upmap,upmap_items} length to CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE
__decode_pg_temp() decodes an user-controlled length but only rejects values large enough to overflow the allocation; it does not bound it to CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE. The helper backs both pg_temp and pg_upmap decoding, and apply_upmap()/get_temp_osds() later copy the decoded list into the fixed-size on-stack array struct ceph_osds.osds[CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE]. A monitor that sends an OSDMap with a pg_temp/pg_upmap entry longer than 32 thus causes a stack out-of-bounds write.
An OSD set for a single PG can never exceed CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE, so reject longer entries at decode time. The bound is well below the old overflow threshold, so it also covers the allocation-size overflow the previous check guarded against.
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds Write of size 4 ... by task exploit kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds (net/ceph/osdmap.c:2617 net/ceph/osdmap.c:2833) calc_target (net/ceph/osd_client.c:1638) __submit_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2394) ceph_osdc_start_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2490) ceph_osdc_call (net/ceph/osd_client.c:5164) rbd_dev_image_probe (drivers/block/rbd.c:6899) do_rbd_add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7138) ... kernel BUG at net/ceph/osdmap.c:2670!
idryomov: do the same in __decode_pg_upmap_items()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: v4l2-fwnode: Fix subdev owner overwritten in v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor()
The v4l2 helper v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor() calls v4l2_async_register_subdev(), which is a macro that expands to __v4l2_async_register_subdev(sd,THIS_MODULE). Since the macro is expanded inside v4l2-fwnode.c, THIS_MODULE resolves to the v4l2-fwnode module rather than the sensor driver module that originally set sd->owner. When v4l2-fwnode is built-in, THIS_MODULE evaluates to NULL, which then overwrites the sensor driver's owner with NULL.
This causes the problem that the sensor module's reference count is never incremented during async registration, so the module can be removed while the subdevice is still in use by a notifier (e.g., a CSI-2 receiver bridge driver).
Fix this by renaming v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor() to
__v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor() with an added explicit module
argument and introducing a wrapper macro:
#define v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor(sd)
__v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor(sd, THIS_MODULE)
This ensures the sensor driver module is properly referenced even when the sensor driver does not init the owner field before calling v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor() and prevents premature module removal.(CVE-2026-68205)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: fix stale skb->prev after async crypto steals a GSO segment
skb_gso_segment() leaves the segment list head with ->prev pointing at the last segment, an invariant validate_xmit_skb_list() relies on when it sets its tail pointer (tail = skb->prev).
When validate_xmit_xfrm() walks a GSO list and some segments are stolen by async crypto (->xmit() returns -EINPROGRESS), those segments are unlinked from the list but the head ->prev is never updated. If the last segment is the one stolen, the returned head still has ->prev pointing at it, even though it is now owned by the crypto engine and may be freed. validate_xmit_skb_list() later does tail->next = skb, writing through that stale pointer -- a use-after-free.
Repoint skb->prev at the last retained segment before returning.(CVE-2026-68426)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ieee80211: validate MLE common info length
ieee80211_mle_common_size() uses the first common-info octet as the common information length for all known MLE types. However, ieee80211_mle_size_ok() only validates that octet for Basic, Probe Request, and TDLS MLEs.
Reconfiguration MLEs also skipped the length octet when calculating the minimum common size, and Priority Access MLEs skipped validation of the advertised common information length.
Account for the Reconfiguration common-info length octet and validate the advertised common information length for all known MLE types. Keep unknown-type handling unchanged.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reset register bounds before narrowing retval range in check_mem_access()
When the BPF verifier processes a context load of an LSM hook return value, it calls __mark_reg_s32_range() to narrow the register to the hook's valid range. However, __mark_reg_s32_range() intersects the new range with the register's existing bounds using max_t()/min_t() rather than replacing them.
If the destination register carries stale bounds from a prior instruction (e.g. BPF_MOV64_IMM), the intersection can produce a range narrower than reality. The verifier then believes it knows the register's exact value, while at runtime the actual hook return value is loaded, creating a verifier/runtime mismatch that can be used to bypass BPF memory safety checks.
The else branch already calls mark_reg_unknown() to reset register state before any narrowing. Apply the same reset in the is_retval path so stale bounds are cleared before __mark_reg_s32_range() intersects.(CVE-2026-72111)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb cgroup rsvd charge/uncharge mismatch
In alloc_hugetlb_folio(), a single h_cg pointer is used for both the rsvd and non-rsvd hugetlb cgroup charges. When map_chg is set, hugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup_rsvd() stores the charged cgroup in h_cg, but the immediately following hugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup() overwrites h_cg with the non-rsvd cgroup pointer.
As a result, hugetlb_cgroup_commit_charge_rsvd() stores the wrong (non-rsvd) cgroup pointer into the folio's rsvd slot.
When the folio is later freed, free_huge_folio() unconditionally calls both hugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio() and hugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio_rsvd(). The rsvd uncharge reads back the wrong cgroup from the folio and decrements a counter that was never charged for that cgroup, causing a page_counter underflow:
page_counter underflow: -512 nr_pages=512 WARNING: mm/page_counter.c:61 at page_counter_cancel
Fix this by introducing a separate h_cg_rsvd pointer exclusively for the rsvd charge path, keeping the rsvd and non-rsvd charges fully independent through their charge, commit, and error uncharge paths.(CVE-2026-72213)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: vgic: Handle race between interrupt affinity change and LPI disabling
Hyunwoo Kim reports some really bad races should the following situation occur:
If the last two race nicely enough, vgic_prune_ap_list() can drop the irq and AP list locks, reacquire them, and in the interval the irq has been freed. UAF follows.
The fix is two-fold:
Before dropping the irq and ap_list locks, take a reference on the irq
Do not try to handle migration of the pending bit: there is no expectation that this state is retained, as per the architecture
With that, we're sure that the interrupt is still around, and we safely remove it from the AP list as it has no target at this stage (unless another interrupt fires, but that's another story).(CVE-2026-72288)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: KVM: Check irq validity in kvm_vcpu_ioctl_interrupt()
Function kvm_vcpu_ioctl_interrupt() can be called from userspace, here add irq validility cheking in kvm_vcpu_ioctl_interrupt().(CVE-2026-72294)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: igmp: Fix potential memory leaks in igmp_mod_timer() and igmp_stop_timer()
When a timer is deleted and not re-armed in igmp_mod_timer(), or stopped in igmp_stop_timer(), the code currently decrements the reference counter of the multicast list entry @im using refcount_dec(&im->refcnt).
However, both functions can be called from the RCU reader path:
If the group im was concurrently removed from the list by ip_mc_dec_group(), its reference count might have already been decremented to 1.
In this case, timer_delete() succeeds, and refcount_dec() decrements the refcount from 1 to 0. Since refcount_dec() does not free the object when it hits 0 (unlike ip_ma_put()), the im structure is leaked.
Fix this by using ip_ma_put(im) instead of refcount_dec(&im->refcnt), and deferring the put until after the spinlock is released.(CVE-2026-72321)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/liquidio: drop cached VF pci_dev LUT
The PF SR-IOV enable path caches VF pci_dev pointers in dpiring_to_vfpcidev_lut[] by iterating with pci_get_device(). Those entries do not own a reference, because the iterator drops the previous device reference on each step. The cached pointer is then dereferenced later when handling OCTEON_VF_FLR_REQUEST.
Replace the cached VF mapping with runtime lookup on the mailbox DPI ring: derive the VF index from q_no, resolve the VF via exported PCI IOV helpers, validate it with the PF pointer and VF ID, then issue pcie_flr() and drop the reference with pci_dev_put(). Remove the unused VF lookup table initialization and cleanup.(CVE-2026-72329)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: add INIT verification after cookie unpacking
In SCTP handshake, the INIT chunk is initially processed by the server and embedded into the cookie carried in INIT-ACK. The client then returns this cookie via COOKIE-ECHO, where the server unpacks it and reconstructs the original INIT chunk.
When cookie authentication is enabled, the cookie contents are protected against tampering, so reusing the unpacked INIT without re-verification is safe.
However, when cookie authentication is disabled, the reconstructed INIT can no longer be trusted. In this case, the INIT must be explicitly validated after unpacking to avoid processing potentially tampered data.
Add sctp_verify_init() checks after cookie unpacking in COOKIE-ECHO processing paths (sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook()) when cookie_auth_enable is disabled. On failure, the new association is freed and the packet is discarded.
Also tighten cookie validation in sctp_unpack_cookie() by verifying the embedded chunk type is SCTP_CID_INIT before treating it as an INIT chunk.
Finally, update sctp_verify_init() to validate parameter bounds using the actual embedded INIT length instead of chunk->chunk_end, since the INIT stored in COOKIE-ECHO may not span the entire chunk buffer.(CVE-2026-72398)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix UAF in cleanup_bearer() due to premature dst_cache_destroy()
TIPC UDP media bearer teardown calls dst_cache_destroy() on its replicast caches before calling synchronize_net() to wait for concurrent RCU readers (transmitters) to finish:
static void cleanup_bearer(struct work_struct *work) { ... list_for_each_entry_safe(rcast, tmp, &ub->rcast.list, list) { dst_cache_destroy(&rcast->dst_cache); list_del_rcu(&rcast->list); kfree_rcu(rcast, rcu); } ... dst_cache_destroy(&ub->rcast.dst_cache); udp_tunnel_sock_release(ub->sk); synchronize_net(); ... }
This is highly buggy because dst_cache_destroy() immediately frees the per-CPU cache memory (free_percpu()) and releases the cached dst entries without any synchronization.
If a concurrent transmitter (e.g., tipc_udp_xmit()) is running on another CPU under RCU protection, it can call dst_cache_get() concurrently, leading to:
Furthermore, calling kfree(ub) immediately after synchronize_net() without closing the socket first (or waiting after closing it) leaves a window where a concurrent receiver (tipc_udp_recv()) could start after synchronize_net(), access ub, and suffer a UAF when kfree(ub) runs.
To fix this, we must defer dst_cache_destroy() and kfree(ub) until after we have ensured that no more readers can see the bearer/socket and all existing readers have finished:
Defer rcast entry destruction (both dst_cache_destroy() and kfree()) to an RCU callback using call_rcu_hurry(). Using call_rcu_hurry() ensures the dst entries are released quickly.
Release the bearer socket using udp_tunnel_sock_release() (stops new receive readers).
Call synchronize_net() to wait for all outstanding RCU readers (both transmit and receive) to finish.
Now that it is safe, call dst_cache_destroy() on the main bearer cache, and free ub.
Note: 3) and 4) can be changed later in net-next to also use call_rcu_hurry() and get rid of the synchronize_net() latency.(CVE-2026-72404)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: udp_tunnel: prevent double queueing in udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync
Yue Sun reported a use-after-free and debugobjects warning in udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync_work() during concurrent device operations.
The workqueue core clears the internal pending bit before invoking the worker. At that point, a concurrent thread can queue the work again. When the already running worker eventually clears the work_pending flag to 0, it mistakenly clears the flag for the newly queued instance. udp_tunnel_nic_unregister() then observes work_pending as 0 and frees the structure while the second work item is still active in the queue, leading to UAF.
Fix this by returning early in udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync() if work_pending is already set, preventing redundant work queueing.(CVE-2026-72405)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Guard conntrack opts error writes
The conntrack lookup and allocation kfuncs take an opts pointer together with an opts__sz argument. The verifier checks only the memory range described by opts__sz, but the wrappers unconditionally write opts->error whenever the internal lookup or allocation helper returns an error.
For an invalid size smaller than the end of opts->error, that write can land outside the verifier-checked range. Keep returning NULL for invalid arguments, but only report the error through opts->error when the supplied size includes the field.
This preserves error reporting for the supported 12-byte and 16-byte layouts, and for other invalid sizes that still include opts->error.(CVE-2026-72423)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix UAF in hci_unregister_dev()
hci_unregister_dev() does not disable cmd_timer and ncmd_timer before the hci_dev structure is freed. If a timeout fires during device teardown, the callback dereferences freed memory (including the hdev->reset function pointer), leading to a use-after-free.
Add disable_delayed_work_sync() calls alongside the existing disable_work_sync() calls to ensure both timers are fully quiesced before teardown proceeds.(CVE-2026-74302)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ixgbe: do not configure xps for XDP queues
netif_set_xps_queue() should not be called for an XDP Tx queue, since such queues are not netdev-exposed. On systems with number of CPUs >=64, on E610 adapter, netdev is configured with maximum number queue pairs being 63 (due to MSI-X assignment), but configuring XDP results in 64 XDP queues.
So, during XDP program load, when netif_set_xps_queue() is called for the last XDP queue, we get a WARNING with a call trace and KASAN report afterwards (if enabled).
[ 2012.699800] WARNING: net/core/dev.c:2854 at __netif_set_xps_queue+0x116a/0x1e40, CPU#36: xdpsock/103668 [...] [ 2012.700029] RIP: 0010:__netif_set_xps_queue+0x116a/0x1e40 [ 2012.700035] Code: b6 34 06 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 01 40 38 f0 7c 09 40 84 f6 0f 85 03 0a 00 00 0f b7 44 24 40 66 43 89 44 6a 18 e9 01 fb ff ff <0f> 0b e9 f2 ee ff ff 44 8b 44 24 44 45 85 c0 74 50 4d 85 e4 0f 84 [ 2012.700040] RSP: 0018:ffff8882369aeb28 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 2012.700046] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000003f RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 2012.700050] RDX: 1ffff1111da3d891 RSI: ffff888120e34250 RDI: ffff8888ed1ec488 [ 2012.700054] RBP: ffff888913281560 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8888ed1ec000 [ 2012.700058] R10: ffff8888a2e83180 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000007fa8 [ 2012.700061] R13: 000000000000003f R14: ffff888120e34854 R15: ffff8889132817c8 [ 2012.700065] FS: 00007fc8ea9ff740(0000) GS:ffff88884cefe000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2012.700069] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2012.700073] CR2: 00007f81c8000020 CR3: 00000002299f8006 CR4: 00000000007726f0 [ 2012.700077] PKRU: 55555554 [ 2012.700080] Call Trace: [ 2012.700084] <TASK> [ 2012.700087] ? ktime_get+0x61/0x150 [ 2012.700097] ? usleep_range_state+0x133/0x1b0 [ 2012.700108] ? __pfx_usleep_range_state+0x10/0x10 [ 2012.700114] netif_set_xps_queue+0x31/0x50 [ 2012.700119] ixgbe_configure_tx_ring+0x472/0x920 [ixgbe] [...] [ 2012.700486] ixgbe_xdp+0x38f/0x750 [ixgbe]
[...]
[ 2012.701094] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __netif_set_xps_queue+0x1ac5/0x1e40 [ 2012.701100] Write of size 4 at addr ffff88888d43cff8 by task xdpsock/103668
Skip XPS configuration for XDP Tx queues.(CVE-2026-74317)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-tcp: fix page fragment cache leak in error path
In nvmet_tcp_alloc_queue(), when a connection is closed during the allocation process (e.g., nvmet_tcp_set_queue_sock() returns -ENOTCONN), the error handling jumps to out_destroy_sq and then to out_ida_remove without draining the page fragment cache.
Although nvmet_tcp_free_cmd() is called in some error paths to release individual page fragments, the underlying page cache reference held by queue->pf_cache is never released. The first allocation using pf_cache is the call to nvmet_tcp_alloc_cmd() for queue->connect, which happens after ida_alloc() returns successfully. This results in a page leak each time a connection fails during allocation, which could lead to memory exhaustion over time if connections are repeatedly opened and closed.
Fix this by calling page_frag_cache_drain() before freeing the queue structure in the out_ida_remove label.(CVE-2026-74386)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Clear Present bit before tearing down scalable-mode context entry
device_pasid_table_teardown() zeroes the 128-bit scalable-mode context entry with context_clear_entry() while the Present bit is still set. This creates a window where the hardware can fetch a torn entry, with some fields already zeroed while Present is still set, leading to unpredictable behavior or spurious faults. The context-cache invalidation is issued only after the entry has been zeroed, and intel_pasid_free_table() then frees the PASID directory pages, so the IOMMU can keep walking a stale Present=1 entry that points at freed memory.
While x86 provides strong write ordering, the compiler may reorder the two 64-bit writes to the entry, and the hardware fetch is not guaranteed to be atomic with respect to multiple CPU writes.
Commit c1e4f1dccbe9d ("iommu/vt-d: Clear Present bit before tearing down context entry") fixed this exact pattern in domain_context_clear_one() and the copied-context path, but device_pasid_table_teardown() was not converted.
Align it with the "Guidance to Software for Invalidations" in the VT-d spec, Section 6.5.3.3, using the same ownership handshake as the sibling fix: clear only the Present bit, flush it to the IOMMU, perform the context-cache invalidation, and only then zero the rest of the entry.(CVE-2026-74439)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() in route_shortcircuit()
route_shortcircuit() currently calls pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr)) (or ipv6hdr), which checks if bytes are available starting from skb->data.
However, in vxlan_xmit(), skb->data points to the MAC header, so skb_network_offset(skb) is ETH_HLEN (14 bytes). Using pskb_may_pull(skb, 20) only checks 20 bytes from skb->data (which is 14 bytes MAC header + 6 bytes of IP header), leaving the rest of the IP header potentially un-pulled in non-linear frags. Subsequent dereferences of ip_hdr(skb)->daddr can read beyond the pulled linear buffer length.
Fix this by using pskb_network_may_pull(), which adds skb_network_offset(skb) to the length check to ensure the full network header is present in the linear buffer.(CVE-2026-74473)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit()
The neighbour hardware address n->ha can be updated asynchronously by the neighbour subsystem, protected by n->ha_lock seqlock. Reading n->ha without holding the seqlock loop can lead to torn reads or reading a partially updated MAC address.
Use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit() to safely copy n->ha under read_seqbegin()/read_seqretry() lock protection before using it.
Note that arp_reduce() and neigh_reduce() seem to have the same issue left for future patches.(CVE-2026-74475)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
veth: convert frag_list skbs before running XDP
A frag_list skb can reach veth with data_len set but nr_frags zero. veth_convert_skb_to_xdp_buff() only converts skbs that are shared, locked, have frags[], or do not have enough headroom. It later uses skb_is_nonlinear() to decide whether to set XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS and xdp_frags_size.
That exposes frag_list data to XDP as if it were stored in frags[], but frags[] is empty. AF_XDP copy mode can then trust the bogus XDP fragment metadata, walk an empty fragment entry, and crash in memcpy() from __xsk_rcv().
Route non-linear skbs through skb_pp_cow_data() before exposing them to XDP, and only advertise XDP frags when the resulting skb has frags[]. skb_copy_bits() already handles frag_list input, and skb_pp_cow_data() builds frags[] output with skb_add_rx_frag(), which is the representation XDP multi-buffer expects.(CVE-2026-74476)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/page_reporting: use system_freezable_wq to fix UAF during suspend. During PM freeze (e.g. S3 suspend or S4 hibernation), device drivers like virtio_balloon reset their underlying virtio devices and delete their virtqueues via vdev->config->del_vqs(). However, page reporting work (page_reporting_process) was scheduled on the global system_wq. Because system_wq lacks the WQ_FREEZABLE flag, the PM freezer skips it, leaving page_reporting_process active during suspend. If pages are freed into the buddy allocator while suspending, page reporting triggers virtballoon_free_page_report() on deleted virtqueues, resulting in a Use-After-Free / General Protection Fault.(CVE-2026-74481)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binfmt_misc: reject a flag character as the field delimiter
The registration string starts with a user chosen delimiter that separates the individual fields. So that the field parsers terminate even on a truncated string create_entry() pads the buffer with that same delimiter.
Most fields are scanned for the delimiter with strchr()/scanarg() and happily stop on the padding. The flags field is different: instead of scanning for the delimiter check_special_flags() consumes the flag characters 'P', 'O', 'C' and 'F' and stops at the first byte that is none of them, relying on the trailing delimiter to end the scan.
If the delimiter is itself a flag character the padding no longer acts as a terminator. The scan swallows all eight padding bytes and keeps reading past the end of the allocation until it hits a byte that is not a flag character.(CVE-2026-74485)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binfmt_misc: restore write access when removing an entry
Registering an entry with the MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE flag opens the interpreter via open_exec() which denies write access to it for as long as the entry exists. Removing the entry closes the interpreter file via filp_close() but never restores write access, leaving the inode's i_writecount permanently negative. Opening the interpreter for writing keeps failing with ETXTBSY long after the entry is gone until the inode is evicted from the inode cache.
Commit 90f601b497d7 ("binfmt_misc: restore write access before closing files opened by open_exec()") fixed the same imbalance in the error path of bm_register_write() but the actual removal path has been leaking the write denial since the introduction of the flag.
Restore write access in put_binfmt_handler() before closing the interpreter file.(CVE-2026-74487)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_akai_output()\n\nsnd_usbmidi_akai_output() computes its fill-loop bound\n\n\tbuf_end = ep->max_transfer - MAX_AKAI_SYSEX_LEN - 1;\n\nas a signed int, so a small device-advertised bulk-OUT max_transfer\nmakes buf_end negative. The loop guard then compares the u32\nurb->transfer_buffer_length against that negative int: the usual\narithmetic conversion turns buf_end into a large unsigned value, so the\nguard stays true and each iteration keeps appending SysEx framing and\npayload bytes past the end of the URB transfer buffer, which is only\nmax_transfer bytes long.\n\nA USB device that advertises a tiny bulk-OUT endpoint can therefore\ntrigger an attacker-length- and content-controlled heap out-of-bounds\nwrite when a process writes to the created /dev/snd/midiCD node.\n\nReturn early when there is no room for even one SysEx, so the loop is\nnever entered with a bound that would wrap. The loop is the last\nstatement of the function, so bailing out is equivalent to it not\nrunning.\n\nDiscovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>(CVE-2026-74499)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: s390: pci: Fix memory accounting for pinned/unpinned pages
The account_mem() and unaccount_mem() functions call get_uid() which increments the reference count of struct user_struct on every invocation. But we don't decrement the count by calling free_uid(). It also accounted/unaccounted the pages against the current->mm. But its possible the unaccount_mem() can be called from a different process context than the one that originally pinned the pages.
Let's fix this by storing the pinning process user_struct and mm_struct when accounting for pinned pages, and subsequently free these resources when the pages are unpinned.
[(CVE-2026-74514)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: ISO: fix leaking sk after socket release
iso_sock_kill() tests !sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) || sk->sk_socket || sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD) for early return, but this is always true since sock_orphan(sk) sets SOCK_DEAD, so the sk reference released by socket always leaks, iso_sock_destruct is never called.
The socket reference also leaks when __iso_sock_close() does not set SOCK_ZAPPED, since iso_conn_del() does not call iso_sock_kill() after zapping.
Fix by replacing SOCK_DEAD by BT_SK_KILLED flag that is not used for something else, and lock_sock to ensure iso_sock_kill() puts sk only after socket release only once. Release and iso_conn_del may run concurrently. Call iso_sock_kill() from iso_conn_del() to clean sk up after zapping.
Remove call to iso_sock_kill() from iso_sock_close(), as it's generally no-op there.(CVE-2026-74536)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: clear new_transport when removing a peer. sctp_process_asconf_param() stores a newly added peer transport in asoc->new_transport. After all parameters in the ASCONF chunk have been processed, sctp_sf_do_asconf() uses this pointer to send a HEARTBEAT to the new transport. An authenticated ASCONF from a remote SCTP peer can add a transport and remove it again with a wildcard DEL-IP parameter in the same chunk. The wildcard deletion preserves the transport on which the ASCONF arrived, but removes the newly added transport through sctp_assoc_del_nonprimary_peers(). The removal does not clear asoc->new_transport, leaving it pointing to the removed transport. sctp_sf_do_asconf() then creates a HEARTBEAT whose chunk->transport points to the removed transport without holding a transport reference. After the transport is freed by RCU, a successful ASCONF_ACK for the replacement address releases the queued HEARTBEAT and sctp_outq_select_transport() reads the freed transport's state, leading to a use-after-free condition.(CVE-2026-74586)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: fix use-after-free of cached ASCONF chunk\n\naddip_last_asconf caches the outstanding outbound ASCONF chunk. The normal\nASCONF-ACK completion path releases the chunk and clears the pointer.\n\nHowever, sctp_asconf_queue_teardown() releases the cached chunk without\nclearing addip_last_asconf. During peer restart handling,\nsctp_sf_do_dupcook_a() queues SCTP_CMD_PURGE_ASCONF_QUEUE, which invokes\nsctp_asconf_queue_teardown() while the association remains alive and leaves\nthe pointer dangling.\n\nA delayed authenticated ASCONF-ACK can then reach sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(),\nwhich accesses the stale chunk and passes it to sctp_process_asconf_ack(),\ncausing a use-after-free and a second release.\n\nClearing the pointer exposes a race with T4 expiry. Peer restart handling\nqueues the timer stop before the purge, but SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP uses\ntimer_delete(), which does not wait for a callback already running on\nanother CPU. Such a callback can reach sctp_sf_t4_timer_expire() after\nthe purge and dereference NULL.\n\nClear addip_last_asconf after releasing the cached chunk, and make\nsctp_sf_t4_timer_expire() consume a stale T4 expiry if no outstanding\nASCONF remains.(CVE-2026-74587)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: keep chunk->transport in step with the list it is queued on. __sctp_outq_flush_rtx() moves a gap-acked chunk onto another transport's transmitted list without updating chunk->transport. The chunk then sits on a live transport's list while chunk->transport still names a different one. If that transport is removed - sctp_assoc_rm_peer() from an ASCONF Delete-IP - sctp_transport_free() RCU-frees it and the chunk is left with a dangling pointer. A SACK that reneges on the TSN clears the flag, and the next SACK reaches inside the freed transport. KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free read in sctp_check_transmitted(), freed from sctp_assoc_rm_peer().(CVE-2026-74588)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: Fix sk_redir use-after-free in send verdict. sk_psock_msg_verdict() takes a socket reference for psock->sk_redir. tcp_bpf_send_verdict() copies that pointer while holding the source socket lock, but does not take a reference for the local copy before dropping the lock around tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(). When apply_bytes keeps the cached verdict active, another sendmsg() on the same source socket can consume the remaining bytes and release the cached reference while the first thread still holds only the raw local pointer, leading to a use-after-free. KASAN reported a slab-use-after-free error.(CVE-2026-74589)
In the Linux kernel, in __filemap_add_folio()'s split-a-conflict loop, xas_set_order() is applied repeatedly, each time modifying xas.xa_index by rounding it down according to the split_order attempted. When a new node is needed but GFP_NOWAIT allocation fails, the lock is dropped, xas_nomem() is used to allocate memory, and the sequence is retried. If the conflict was meanwhile resolved by another thread (e.g., inserting a folio at the same index), the current thread may put the folio into the xarray at an intermediate rounded-down index, causing a race condition. This can lead to rare SIGILLs and SIGSEGVs in production, and triggers the !folio_contains() bug when CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y is enabled.(CVE-2026-74591)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventfs: Fix use-after-free in eventfs_remove_rec(). eventfs_remove_rec() recursively removes the child at the current loop position. After the recursive call returns, list_for_each_entry() advances by reading list.next from the removed child. If free_ei() drops the final reference, release_ei() reuses the list/rcu union to queue an SRCU callback. The child may be freed before that read. The eventfs_mutex serializes list updates, but it does not keep the removed child alive or prevent the SRCU callback from running.(CVE-2026-74606)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: Fix use-after-free in cifs_try_adding_channels(). cifs_try_adding_channels() takes a temporary reference to an interface before dropping iface_lock. If cifs_ses_add_channel() fails, it drops that reference and then increments iface->weight_fulfilled. A concurrent interface list refresh can remove the list reference while channel creation is in progress. In that case, the failure-path kref_put() releases the last reference and frees iface. Updating weight_fulfilled afterward then accesses freed memory.(CVE-2026-74608)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: read le->link under the node lock in tipc_node_link_down(). tipc_node_link_down() caches the link pointer before taking n->lock. The delete=true caller frees that very object under n->lock, so the lock does not protect the cached pointer against it. An in-flight CPU that has read l therefore dereferences freed memory once another CPU frees it: a use-after-free read in tipc_link_is_establishing(), and a use-after-free write via tipc_link_reset() on the establishing branch.(CVE-2026-74609)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: don't leave a full plaintext sk_msg ring unpushed
When the copy path in tls_sw_sendmsg_locked() adds the fragment that fills the plaintext sk_msg ring, it does not set full_record, so the record is left full and unpushed. A later splice() then adds to an already full ring: sk_msg_page_add() has no fullness check of its own, so sg.end wraps onto sg.start and the ring appears empty. Fragments added after that overwrite live entries, and sg.size no longer matches what is reachable between sg.start and sg.end, so pushing the record runs the scatterwalk off the end of the scatterlist.
An unprivileged user can trigger this on a loopback TCP socket with the "tls" ULP attached:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 RIP: 0010:memcpy_from_scatterwalk+0x32/0xc0 Call Trace: skcipher_walk_next+0x1d1/0x2c0 gcm_encrypt_aesni_avx+0x1e9/0x220 bpf_exec_tx_verdict+0x3bb/0x860 tls_sw_sendmsg+0xa1a/0xca0 __sys_sendto+0x1da/0x1f0
Set full_record in the copy path when the ring becomes full, and push a record that is already full on entry to the sendmsg loop.(CVE-2026-74610)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: rx: restore msg_iter before TLS 1.3 optimistic retry. tls_decrypt_sg() advances msg->msg_iter when it maps user pages for the optimistic TLS 1.3 zero-copy path. If the decrypted record turns out not to be unpadded application data, tls_decrypt_sw() retries into a kernel skb, but leaves the iterator advanced. The subsequent copy from the skb then writes decrypted bytes again at a later point in the caller iovecs while recvmsg() reports only the post-retry length. A TLS peer can trigger this after the receiver enables TLS_RX_EXPECT_NO_PAD.(CVE-2026-74611)
In the Linux kernel, the veth driver has an skb length accounting error after XDP frag adjustment. veth exposes non-linear skb fragments through an xdp_buff. If an XDP program adjusts the fragment area, veth_xdp_rcv_skb() copies xdp_frags_size back to skb->data_len but leaves skb->len containing the old fragment contribution. After a fragment shrink, this makes skb_headlen() larger than the actual linear area. In the reproduced UDP receive path, __skb_datagram_iter() copied 1024 bytes past the actual linear tail to userspace, starting at struct skb_shared_info. Additionally, bpf_xdp_pull_data() can advance data_end while leaving frags present, and the old __skb_put(skb, off) triggers SKB_LINEAR_ASSERT().(CVE-2026-74612)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvsock/virtio: read virtqueues under worker locks\n\nCommit bd50c5dc182b ("vsock/virtio: add support for device suspend/resume") made the *_run flags transition from false to true when restore installs replacement virtqueues. The RX, TX and event workers read their virtqueue before locking and checking the corresponding flag, so a worker delayed across freeze and restore can observe the replacement queue's running state while retaining a pointer to the deleted queue.\n\nRead each virtqueue under its mutex after checking the run flag, keeping the pointer and state in the same queue generation.(CVE-2026-74614)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: do not arm the ageing timer on a device that is down. vxlan_changelink() arms vxlan->age_timer whenever the requested ageing interval differs from the configured one, but there is no netif_running() test, so the timer is armed even on a device that was never brought up. The only synchronous cancel in the driver is the timer_delete_sync() in vxlan_stop(), which is .ndo_stop. netif_close_many() drops devices without IFF_UP before __dev_close_many() runs, so that cancel is skipped for such a device. When free_netdev() releases the allocation, the timer lives in freed memory while still queued on a timer_base, causing a use-after-free condition that can lead to system crash or code execution.(CVE-2026-74615)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xdp: reject clones that overrun skb_shared_info tailroom. xdpf_clone() clones broadcast copies into a single page and sets frame_sz to PAGE_SIZE. __xdp_build_skb_from_frame() later treats that page like a normal XDP frame and expects the usual skb_shared_info tailroom at the end of the buffer. The current check only rejects frames whose linear xdp_frame header, headroom, and packet data exceed PAGE_SIZE. A source frame backed by a larger allocation can still satisfy that check while extending into the clone's required shared-info area. When such a clone is converted back into an skb, build_skb_around() places skb_shared_info over live packet bytes and later writes can corrupt XDP return metadata. Reject clones unless their linear area fits inside SKB_WITH_OVERHEAD(PAGE_SIZE), matching the tailroom requirement already enforced by the XDP-to-skb conversion path.(CVE-2026-74616)
In the Linux kernel, an input validation vulnerability exists in the net/sched subsystem. The act_gact and act_police modules lack range checking on the fallback control action. The tcf_action_check_ctrlact() function performs range checking on the primary control action, but act_gact and act_police each carry a second, independent control action supplied by user space (TCA_GACT_PROB.paction and TCA_POLICE_RESULT) that never reaches that helper. User space can set TC_ACT_CONSUMED (TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX + 1), which tells callers the action took ownership of the skb, resulting in memory leaks of sk_buff and its data buffer - one leaked sk_buff per packet traversing the filter.(CVE-2026-74620)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: atlantic: free stranded TX buffers on ring deinit\n\naq_vec_deinit() drains the TX rings with a single aq_ring_tx_clean() call, which frees at most AQ_CFG_TX_CLEAN_BUDGET (256) descriptors and stops at hw_head, which no longer moves once aq_vec_stop() has stopped the hardware and NAPI. Completed descriptors beyond the budget and everything still posted in [hw_head, sw_tail) keep their skb or xdp_frame when the interface goes down: aq_vec_ring_free() then frees the buffer ring and the references are lost for good.\n\nToday this is a silent memory leak on every interface down under TX/XDP_TX load. With the conversion of the RX path to page_pool posted for net-next it becomes much more visible: XDP_TX frames carry fragment references on the RX ring's page_pool, so a single stranded frame keeps the pool's inflight count above zero forever. page_pool_destroy() then never completes, the pool is leaked together with its pages, and "page_pool_release_retry() stalled pool shutdown" is warned every 60 seconds from that point on, on every ifdown, XDP detach or ring resize under XDP_TX load.(CVE-2026-74623)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack: defer invalid log until after unlock
TCP and SCTP conntrack paths can emit invalid-packet logs while ct->lock is still held.
When invalid logging is routed to nfnetlink_log and conntrack export is enabled, the log path can re-enter conntrack netlink glue and dump the same conntrack again. Protocol attribute dumping may take ct->lock, so logging while holding that lock can deadlock.
Defer the TCP invalid logs by storing only the minimal log context while ct->lock is held and emitting the log after unlocking. Also make the TCP timeout-lowering invalid path return whether a log is needed, then emit that log after unlocking.
Do the same for the SCTP invalid state-transition log that can be reached while ct->lock is held.
Add a lockdep assertion to nf_ct_l4proto_log_invalid() so future callers that log invalid conntracks while holding ct->lock are caught outside TCP and SCTP as well.(CVE-2026-74624)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix race between update_event_fields and event_define_fields. The following sequence may lead to a race between event_define_fields() and update_event_fields(): CPU0 (loads module A) and CPU1 (loads module B) executing concurrently, where access to class->fields is not protected by event_mutex in trace_event_update_all(), leading to a kernel panic. Fix by taking event_mutex in trace_event_update_all() before trace_event_sem.(CVE-2026-74636)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/core: Fix group leader use-after-free after sibling detach. perf_group_detach() handles leader and sibling detach differently. When a sibling is detached, it is removed from the leader's sibling_list, but its group_leader pointer is left pointing at the old leader. This is not safe when the sibling is detached but kept alive, such as during CPU hotplug with DETACH_GROUP. A PERF_IOC_FLAG_GROUP ioctl on the sibling follows the stale group_leader pointer and dereferences the freed leader's context, leading to a use-after-free condition.(CVE-2026-74637)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: fix use-after-free in fib_nhc_update_mtu(). fib_nhc_update_mtu() walks the nexthop exception table under RTNL, but RTNL does not serialize this walk with PMTU exception updates. The walk uses rcu_dereference_protected() with a constant true condition without holding fnhe_lock. The following interleaving can therefore occur: CPU 0 (fib_nhc_update_mtu) loads fnhe while CPU 1 (update_or_create_fnhe) holds fnhe_lock, calls fnhe_remove_oldest() to unlink fnhe, and kfree_rcu(fnhe, rcu). CPU 0 then accesses fnhe after grace period, causing a use-after-free. KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in fib_nhc_update_mtu+0x3df/0x410.(CVE-2026-74656)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ebt_nflog: pin the NFLOG backend
nf_log_unregister() runs after the per-net teardown so its final RCU grace period also drains readers that obtained the logger from a per-net binding. However, ebt_nflog passes an explicit ULOG log type to nf_log_packet() without holding a reference on the selected logger module, unlike the xt_NFLOG and nft_log frontends.
An ebtables nflog rule can therefore remain callable while nfnetlink_log is unloaded. The resulting interleaving causes a use-after-free condition where CPU 1 dereferences per-net state after CPU 0 has freed it.(CVE-2026-74660)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: inet: frags: publish queues before arming timer. inet_frag_create() arms the fragment queue timer before inserting the queue into the fqdir rhashtable. If the namespace fragment timeout is zero or negative, the timer can run before the queue is published. The timer callback then marks the queue complete, tries to remove a node that is not in the hash table yet, and drops the anticipated hash reference. Creation can subsequently publish the completed queue without restoring that reference, leaving a stale hash node after the caller drops the remaining reference. Publish the queue first and arm the timer while holding the queue lock. This makes timer expiry wait until the queue is visible in the hash table, so inet_frag_kill() can remove the node and balance the hash reference.(CVE-2026-74662)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\npacket: synchronize pressure clearing with ring reconfiguration\n\npacket_set_ring() updates the RX ring state under sk_receive_queue.lock, but used to publish the tpacket receive mode through po->prot_hook.func after releasing that lock. packet_poll() and packet_recvmsg() can then run the pressure clearing path after the ring has been cleared while still seeing tpacket_rcv, causing __packet_rcv_has_room() to dereference stale or NULL ring storage.(CVE-2026-74666)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/packet: reset the MAC header on the packet-socket transmit path
packet_parse_headers() resets the MAC header only for a SOCK_RAW frame whose socket did not bind a protocol. A protocol-bound SOCK_RAW socket, any SOCK_DGRAM frame, and the legacy SOCK_PACKET path therefore leave skb->mac_header unset here.
For frames sent via __dev_queue_xmit() this is harmless: it resets the MAC header unconditionally. But the packet-socket PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS path uses dev_direct_xmit(), which does not, so the frame reaches ndo_start_xmit() with the MAC header unset. A driver that reads eth_hdr(skb) on transmit then dereferences skb->head + (u16)~0, an out-of-bounds access ~64 KiB past the head -- the same class fixed for one consumer in commit f5089008f90c ("macsec: do not read an unset MAC header in macsec_encrypt()").
packet_parse_headers() runs only on the transmit path, where skb->data points at the start of the L2 header for every packet-socket type regardless of its length: SOCK_RAW and SOCK_PACKET carry a user-supplied header and SOCK_DGRAM has one built by dev_hard_header(). Reset the MAC header unconditionally, mirroring __dev_queue_xmit(), so the frame is anchored on the bypass path too.
Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis; verified against source and matched to the macsec KASAN report in f5089008f90c. Compile-tested.(CVE-2026-74667)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipvs: clear IPv4 options after rebasing tunnel ICMP errors. ip_vs_in_icmp() rebases an skb from the outer ICMP packet to the quoted original request before passing it to icmp_send(). However, IPCB(skb)->opt still describes the outer IPv4 header. A timestamp option in the outer header can therefore leave an offset that points into the quoted transport header after the rebase. __ip_options_echo() treats a byte at that stale location as the option length and copies it into the fixed-size option storage on the __icmp_send() stack, causing a stack out-of-bounds write.(CVE-2026-74669)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: stop estimator after disabled calc phase
IPVS estimator kthread 0 starts with zeroed chain and tick limits until its initial calculation phase completes. If network namespace teardown clears ipvs->enable during that phase, ip_vs_est_calc_phase() can return without installing positive limits.
The kthread can then continue into its main loop and drain est_temp_list with zero chain_max, tick_max and est_max_count values. Each enqueue consumes one available tick row, but est_count never reaches the zero est_max_count value. After all rows are consumed, the row lookup returns IPVS_EST_NTICKS and ip_vs_enqueue_estimator() writes past the ticks and tick_len arrays, causing a buffer overflow.
Exit kthread 0 after the calculation phase if the kthread is stopping or IPVS has been disabled. That keeps temporary estimators from being drained after the limits failed to initialize.
Estimator kthreads can now self-exit before teardown or reload stops kd->task. Keep an extra task reference after creation and release it with kthread_stop_put(), so kd->task remains valid until the stop paths consume that reference.(CVE-2026-74670)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: evdev - fix information leak in evdev_pass_values(). In evdev_pass_values(), the input_event structure is allocated on the kernel stack and populated field-by-field. However, it is never fully initialized. On architectures where struct input_event contains explicit or implicit padding (such as the 32-bit __pad field on SPARC64), these padding bytes are left uninitialized. When this event structure is subsequently passed to the client buffer and later copied to userspace, the uninitialized padding bytes leak kernel stack memory, potentially exposing sensitive information. Similar issues exist in __evdev_queue_syn_dropped and __pass_event. Fix this by explicitly zeroing the entire event structure with memset() before populating its fields. This ensures all padding bytes are cleared before the data crosses the security boundary.(CVE-2026-74673)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: evdev - sanitize event type index when fetching event masks. The user-supplied event type index passed to EVIOCGMASK / EVIOCSMASK ioctls is used to index the static counts array in evdev_get_mask_cnt() and client evmasks array in evdev_get_mask(). While the event type is architecturally bounded by EV_CNT, speculative execution may mispredict bounds checks and perform out-of-bounds loads. Sanitize the event type index in evdev_get_mask_cnt() branchlessly using array_index_mask_nospec(). This clamps the index to 0 for safe array access and forces the returned count to 0 speculatively when the index is out of bounds, preventing any speculative memory access to client evmasks array.(CVE-2026-74683)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: tap: set skb->dev before parsing virtio net header in tap_get_user_xdp()\n\nThe commit 4f61f133f354 ("net: tap: NULL pointer derefence in dev_parse_header_protocol when skb->dev is null") fixed a crash in tap_get_user() by assigning skb->dev before calling tun_vnet_hdr_to_skb(). This is required because virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() may invoke dev_parse_header_protocol(), which dereferences skb->dev. Without the assignment, a NULL pointer dereference can occur.\n\nHowever, tap_get_user_xdp() still parses the virtio-net header before assigning skb->dev. When the vhost TX path passes an XDP buffer containing a GSO virtio-net header but the protocol is set to zero on purpose, tun_vnet_hdr_to_skb() can reach dev_parse_header_protocol() while skb->dev is still NULL, resulting in a crash.\n\nFix this by looking up the tap device and assigning skb->dev before calling tun_vnet_hdr_to_skb(), matching the ordering already used in tap_get_user(). Preserve the existing RCU read-side critical section across dev_queue_xmit().(CVE-2026-74684)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: clear control chunk transport if it is being removed\n\nsctp_make_heartbeat_ack() caches the destination transport in chunk->transport without taking a reference. When src_out_of_asoc_ok is enabled, the HEARTBEAT ACK may remain queued on control_chunk_list instead of being transmitted immediately.\n\nIf the peer transport is removed while the chunk is still queued, sctp_assoc_rm_peer() drops the transport and schedules it for RCU freeing, but only clears cached transport pointers in out_chunk_list. The queued control chunk therefore retains a dangling transport pointer.\n\nOnce an ASCONF_ACK clears the suppression and the queued control chunk is transmitted, SCTP dereferences the stale transport pointer, leading to a use-after-free.\n\nFix this by also clearing chunk->transport for queued control chunks in control_chunk_list when removing the transport.(CVE-2026-74688)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: fix TFO max_qlen accounting across reuseport migration. A listener's TCP_FASTOPEN max_qlen stops being accurate and lets through far more pending Fast Open requests than it was configured for. This only shows up with SO_REUSEPORT listener migration, where closing a listener hands its still-pending TFO children over to a surviving one. fastopenq.qlen is charged in tcp_fastopen_create_child() when the child is created and uncharged in reqsk_fastopen_remove() when the handshake completes. The uncharge follows rsk_listener of the request the child points at, and inet_reqsk_clone() has repointed the child at a new request owned by the new listener, so the ++ and the -- land on two different sockets. The new listener's qlen drifts negative and its limit no longer binds. Charge the new listener during migration, like reqsk_queue_migrated() already does for queue->young and queue->qlen.(CVE-2026-74696)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udp: fix potential use-after-free in tunnel segmentation
__skb_udp_tunnel_segment() gets the UDP header before ensuring the tunnel header is in the skb head. If the pull reallocates skb->head, the saved UDP header pointer is no longer valid.
Get the UDP header after the pull to avoid a potential use-after-free.(CVE-2026-74705)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Preserve pointer state for commuted arithmetic
When scalar += pointer is handled in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), the destination register inherits the pointer state from the source pointer. Copying only selected fields is fragile because pointer provenance is tracked by several bpf_reg_state fields.
Use the caller's temporary offset register to preserve the scalar operand while replacing the destination with the full pointer state. This preserves the frame number for PTR_TO_STACK registers and keeps parent identity fields consistent.(CVE-2026-74720)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbonding: alb: re-check primary_is_promisc under RTNL in bond_alb_monitor\n\nbond_alb_monitor() reads primary_is_promisc under RCU, then drops RCU and takes RTNL via rtnl_trylock() before undoing the promiscuity it set on the active slave. In that window the active slave can change under RTNL (RTM_DELLINK -> __bond_release_one() -> bond_alb_handle_active_change()), which already drops the promiscuity and clears primary_is_promisc. The monitor still acts on the stale decision: if the slave was removed with no failover, curr_active_slave is now NULL and the deref faults; if it failed over, the stale dev_set_promiscuity(-1) underflows the new slave's promiscuity counter and pins it in IFF_PROMISC.\n\n Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ...\n KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]\n Workqueue: b42 bond_alb_monitor\n RIP: 0010:bond_alb_monitor (drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1600)\n process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322)\n worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486)\n kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)\n ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)\n Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception\n\nRe-check primary_is_promisc (and curr_active_slave) after taking RTNL so the monitor only undoes an increment it still owns. The other bonding monitors already re-read state under RTNL in their commit phase (bond_miimon_commit/bond_ab_arp_commit); bond_alb_monitor() was the only one acting on the pre-trylock decision.(CVE-2026-74726)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_u32: skip hash tables in u32_bind_class(). u32_walk() enumerates both struct tc_u_hnode and struct tc_u_knode through the walker callback. u32_bind_class() unconditionally casts the passed fh to tc_u_knode and accesses &n->res, so when fh is actually a tc_u_hnode, which has no tcf_result member, this results in a slab-out-of-bounds read of res->classid in tc_cls_bind_class().(CVE-2026-74739)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvlan: inherit needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from phy_dev
ipvlan devices inherit hard_header_len from phy_dev during ipvlan_init(), but leave needed_headroom and needed_tailroom set to 0.
When the underlying phy_dev (or stacked lower device) requires extra headroom or tailroom for headers/trailers (e.g. macsec, ipsec, wireguard, tunnels, or veth with rx headroom), upper layers calculating packet headroom and tailroom fail to reserve sufficient space.
This can result in reallocation overhead, skb headroom underflows, or KASAN slab-use-after-free crashes when dev_hard_header() / ipvlan_hard_header() prepends header data or when lower devices append tailroom.
Fix this by:
In the Linux kernel, the netfilter/ipset component has a refcount race condition vulnerability. __ip_set_put_byindex() resolved the index to a set pointer under RCU, then took ip_set_ref_lock in __ip_set_put() to decrement set->ref. ip_set_swap() holds that same lock while swapping both the ip_set_list slots and the two sets' ref counters, so it can interleave between the dereference and the lock acquisition, leaving the caller to decrement a set whose reference already moved to the other index and hit BUG_ON(set->ref == 0). list_set_gc() reaches this from timer softirq, which the nfnl mutex does not serialize against swap: an expiring list:set member calls list_set_del() -> ip_set_put_byindex() while IPSET_CMD_SWAP runs on the referenced sets. This vulnerability can cause kernel panic.(CVE-2026-74748)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: Reject exited events as group leaders
perf_event_remove_on_exec() sets remove-on-exec events to the EXIT state and detaches their group relationships. The event's file descriptor can remain open, however, and perf_event_open() currently accepts that event as a group leader because its early validation rejects only REVOKED and DEAD events.
A new sibling can consequently be linked to the detached leader. When the leader is closed, perf_group_detach() observes that its PERF_ATTACH_GROUP bit is already clear and skips the new sibling. The sibling then retains a group_leader pointer to the freed event.
Reject group leaders in the EXIT state. Perform the check while holding the shared context mutex so that an exec in the target task cannot detach the leader between validation and group attachment.
peterz: make the earlier test fully consistent
In the Linux kernel, a deadlock vulnerability has been found in the ceph filesystem. A reader can hang forever in __ceph_get_caps() when the client no longer holds FILE_RD, but local cap state still says that the capability is already wanted (via mds_wanted). One way to trigger this is through MDS cap revocation. If another client performs a conflicting operation, the MDS can revoke FILE_RD from the reader; the next read then has to reacquire FILE_RD. If the cap update that should request FILE_RD never reaches the MDS after cap->mds_wanted was raised, the reader is left holding only non-file caps while local mds_wanted still includes the file read caps, causing the reader to wait indefinitely.(CVE-2026-80527)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: avoid fs reclaim while using current->journal_info. handle_reply() stores a ceph_mds_request pointer in current->journal_info while filling the inode and dentry cache from an MDS reply. An allocation in this section can enter direct reclaim and prune dentries from another filesystem. If this dirties an ext4 inode, ext4 starts a JBD2 transaction. JBD2 interprets the Ceph request in current->journal_info as a journal handle and dereferences the request's r_tid as h_transaction, causing a kernel crash.(CVE-2026-80528)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxfs: don't swallow dquot recovery verification errors\n\nxlog_recover_dquot_commit_pass2() validates the recovered dquot with xfs_dqblk_verify() and, on failure, sets error = -EFSCORRUPTED and jumps to out_release. But out_release unconditionally returns 0, so the corruption error is discarded: the caller xlog_recover_items_pass2() sees success, log recovery proceeds as if the dquot were valid, and the corrupt quota buffer can be written back to disk.(CVE-2026-80529)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: fix OOB read in decode_watchers() via missing bounds check
ceph_start_decoding() validates that struct_len bytes remain in the buffer after the encoding header, but accepts struct_len=0 as valid: ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes. When a malicious or compromised OSD sends an obj_list_watch_response_t reply with struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end, leaving zero bytes guaranteed for subsequent reads.
The immediately following ceph_decode_32(p) in decode_watchers() has no preceding bounds check. With p == end this is a 4-byte read past the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is then passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as the watcher count.
The sibling function decode_watcher() already uses the safe variants (ceph_decode_copy_safe, ceph_decode_64_safe, ceph_decode_skip_32) after its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_watchers() is the only site that uses the bare variant, confirming an oversight.
Fix by replacing ceph_decode_32(p) with ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_watchers, bad), consistent with the established pattern.
Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph deployment (e.g. cloud) can trigger this against any kernel client that calls CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS, without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Avoid using invalid osd indices from primary_temp
A corrupted osdmap received from a Ceph monitor or OSD may contain osd indices in its pg_temp, primary_temp, pg_upmap, and pg_upmap_items parts that don't exist, i.e., that are greater than max_osd or smaller than CEPH_HOMELESS_OSD (-1). These indices are used to create the up and acting set in ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds(), called from calc_target(). While most of these osd indices are checked, the one from primary_temp is not. Subsequently, this may lead to calc_target() returning this (potentially invalid) index as target osd for a (linger) request. Because the osd_state, osd_weight, and osd_addr arrays only contain max_osd entries (with indices 0 to max_osd -1), this leads to out-of-bounds accesses when trying to read values from these arrays.
This patch fixes the issue by adding a check to get_temp_osds(), so that only valid osd indices from primary_temp are used, and it falls back to using the primary from pg_temp or the up set if it is invalid.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmptcp: avoid combining some incoming suboptions\n\nSome MPTCP suboptions are mutually exclusive according to the RFC8684, but also because in different places, the code doesn't expect some combinations to be present. That's specially true for suboptions that would be present twice, but with different attributes.\n\nThe new restrictions are the same as the ones applied on the output side, with mptcp_write_options. The same rules can be reused with a small fix: an MP_FASTCLOSE can be used with a DSS when the sender picks this option [1], which is not the case on Linux.(CVE-2026-80587)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: stop the timeout timer when releasing a never added disk
disk_release() undoes blk_mq_init_allocated_queue() for a disk whose probe failed before add_disk(), but it only calls blk_mq_exit_queue(). Nothing there stops q->timeout, and that timer rolls forward: it stays pending until it next expires, not until the last request completes. So if the driver issued any I/O before adding the disk, the request_queue is freed while still linked into a timer wheel bucket.
Commit 6f8191fdf41d ("block: simplify disk shutdown") dropped the blk_cleanup_queue() call that used to stop it. __del_gendisk() and blk_mq_destroy_queue() still do; only the probe failure path lost it.
nvme gets there because nvme_update_ns_info() submits Report Zones or FDP io-mgmt-recv on ns->queue before the disk is added, so a later failure - a concurrent reset setting NVME_CTRL_FROZEN, or device_add_disk() failing - lands in put_disk() with the timer armed, leading to a use-after-free condition.(CVE-2026-80589)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing/probes: Remove WARN_ON_ONCE from parse_btf_arg. Sashiko found that user can cause this WARN_ON_ONCE() easily with adding a kprobe event based on a raw address with BTF parameter. Since this is not an unexpected condition, remove the WARN_ON_ONCE().(CVE-2026-80607)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/hns: Fix warning in poll cq direct mode\n\nCQs allocated by ib_alloc_cq() always have a comp_handler. Though\nin direct mode this handler is never expected to be called, it\nis still called when the driver is reset, triggering the following\nWARN_ONCE():\n\nCall trace:\nib_cq_completion_direct+0x38/0x60\nhns_roce_cq_completion+0x54/0x90 (hns_roce_hw_v2]\nhns_roce_handle_device_err+Ox1c8/0x340 [hns_roce_hw_v2]\nhns_roce_hw_v2_uninit_instance.constprop.0+0x34/0x70 [hns_roce_hw_v2]\nhns_roce_hw_v2_reset_notify+0xc4/0xe0 [hns_roce_hw_v2]\nhclge_notify_roce_client+0x60/0xbc [hclge]\nhclge_reset_rebuild+0x48/0x34c [hclge]\nhclge_reset_subtask+0xcc/0xec [hclge]\nhclge_reset_service_task+0x80/0x160 [hclge]\nhclge_service_task+0x50/0x80 (hclge]\nprocess_one_work+0x1cc/0x4d0\nworker_thread+0x154/0x414\nkthread+0x104/0x144\nret_from_fork+0x10/0x18(CVE-2026-80647)
{
"severity": "Critical"
}{
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