PYSEC-2026-3602

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Import Source
https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/blob/main/vulns/open-webui/PYSEC-2026-3602.yaml
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/PYSEC-2026-3602
Aliases
Published
2026-08-04T11:34:42.461003Z
Modified
2026-08-04T14:30:28.965011814Z
Severity
  • 3.1 (Low) CVSS_V3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L CVSS Calculator
Summary
Open WebUI: Scheduled automations continue after pending-user deactivation and stored model ACL revocation
Details

Title: Scheduled automations continue after pending-user deactivation and stored model ACL revocation

Summary

Open WebUI documents pending as a zero-access role used for new sign-ups and deactivated users, and normal HTTP routes enforce that with get_verified_user() (which rejects pending), while automation create/update/run routes additionally require the features.automations permission. Two paths missed that lifecycle gate, so a deactivated (pending) account could keep acting through the background automation scheduler:

  1. Scheduler did not re-gate the owner. When a stored automation became due, execute_automation() rehydrated the owner with Users.get_user_by_id(...) and re-entered the chat completion pipeline without re-checking that the owner was still user/admin or still held features.automations. A still-active automation therefore kept running after its owner was deactivated.
  2. Model ACL only enforced for exact role user. check_model_access() applied private-model grants only when user.role == "user", so a pending principal fell through a branch that denies a normal non-owner user.

Net effect: a deactivated account could continue scheduled chat generation through the background worker, consuming the operator's configured model-provider credentials and reaching a stored automation model ID that its current role/ACL state would no longer permit through normal routes.

Impact

A pending/deactivated account continues to execute due scheduled automations after its access has been revoked, consuming the operator's provider credentials, quota and shared capacity, and bypassing the private-model ACL for the automation's stored model ID. Exploitation requires a previously created active automation and a later transition to pending (deactivation or approval rollback), so it is bounded and not interactive. It does not grant unauthenticated access, account takeover, code execution, or cross-user data exfiltration.

Patched

In 0.10.0:

  • execute_automation() aborts and records an error unless the rehydrated owner is still user or admin and (for non-admins) still holds features.automations, so a deactivated or de-permissioned owner's due automation no longer runs.
  • check_model_access() enforces model ACLs for every non-admin role rather than only the exact role user, so a pending or otherwise unrecognised role no longer falls through.

Credits

@rexpository

References

Affected packages

PyPI / open-webui

Package

Affected ranges

Type
ECOSYSTEM
Events
Introduced
0.9.0
Fixed
0.10.0

Affected versions

0.*
0.9.0
0.9.1
0.9.2
0.9.3
0.9.4
0.9.5
0.9.6

Database specific

source
"https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/blob/main/vulns/open-webui/PYSEC-2026-3602.yaml"