When the vLLM API receives a malformed request (e.g., invalid JSON or missing required fields), FastAPI raises a Pydantic RequestValidationError. The validation_exception_handler in vllm/entrypoints/openai/server_utils.py converts this exception to a string via str(exc), which includes the internal file path and line number of the handler function. The existing sanitize_message() function in vllm/entrypoints/utils.py strips memory addresses (e.g., 0x7f...) but does not strip File "...", line X patterns. The result is a user-facing HTTP response that leaks internal system information.
An unauthenticated attacker can extract the following with a single malformed request:
ubuntu)/home/ubuntu/)vllm-env/)3.12)vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/api_router.py)This information aids attackers in constructing targeted exploits: environment paths narrow the attack surface, and handler function names + line numbers enable exact version identification even when the /version endpoint is disabled.
All POST endpoints that accept JSON bodies are affected, including /v1/chat/completions, /v1/completions, /tokenize, and /detokenize.
Deploying vLLM behind a reverse proxy that rewrites error response bodies to strip file paths would mitigate this, though it is fragile.
Two possible fixes (either suffices):
Option A — Fix validation_exception_handler: Construct the error message from exc.errors() (the structured Pydantic error list) rather than str(exc). This avoids the traceback-style string entirely.
Option B — Fix sanitize_message: Add a regex to strip File "...", line \d+ patterns, similar to how memory addresses are already stripped:
import re
msg = re.sub(r'File ".*?", line \d+, in \w+', '[internal]', msg)
Option A is preferred as it addresses the root cause rather than filtering symptoms.
This was fixed here: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/e87521626f