PYSEC-2026-4042

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Import Source
https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/blob/main/vulns/djust/PYSEC-2026-4042.yaml
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/PYSEC-2026-4042
Aliases
Published
2026-10-01T16:38:30Z
Modified
2026-10-01T17:45:02Z
Severity
  • 7.1 (High) CVSS_V4 - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N CVSS Calculator
Summary
djust: Client mass-assignment of arbitrary view attributes via the default dj-model update_model handler
Details

Impact

djust.mixins.model_binding.ModelBindingMixin provides a default update_model event handler and is part of the LiveView base MRO, so every LiveView exposes it. It setattrs a view attribute whose name is client-supplied (field), gated only by: reject _-prefixed names; reject a 14-entry denylist of framework internals (FORBIDDEN_MODEL_FIELDS); optional allowed_model_fields which defaults to None = allow all; and hasattr existence.

Result: a client can set any public, existing view attribute — not just the fields actually bound with dj-model= in the rendered template. The denylist covers framework plumbing but nothing about developer business/authz state, and the allowlist is opt-in (off by default). A developer who binds one dj-model="search" input and also keeps self.account_id / self.is_admin / self.total_price as view state does not realize a client can set ALL of them via {type:event, event:"update_model", params:{field, value}} over the WebSocket. Type coercion matches the target attribute's type (so "true" -> bool True), aiding the attacker.

Severity High for apps that hold authorization/ownership/business state in public view attributes (the normal djust pattern) -> state tampering / IDOR / authz-flag manipulation; Low otherwise. Default-on across every LiveView. For a public (no-login) view an anonymous client can mass-assign; for an authenticated view a logged-in user can tamper their own session's view state (the IDOR/authz vector when downstream handlers act on it without re-authorizing).

Reproduced: a view with account_id/is_admin/total_price (none bound with dj-model) had all three set via update_model calls.

Patches

Restrict the default handler to fields actually exposed via dj-model=: have the template renderer record the bound-field set per render and reject any field outside it (preferred, secure + zero-config); or make allowed_model_fields fail-closed (required). Keep FORBIDDEN_MODEL_FIELDS only as defense-in-depth. Add a regression that a non-dj-model public attribute (e.g. is_admin) is rejected while a bound field still updates.

Workarounds

Set allowed_model_fields explicitly on every view using dj-model (or subclassing LiveView) to the minimal list of bindable fields; do not keep authorization/ownership state in public view attributes that share the view with dj-model bindings.

References

Reproducer + finding writeup retained privately by the maintainer.

References

Affected packages

PyPI / djust

Package

Affected ranges

Type
ECOSYSTEM
Events
Introduced
0 Unknown introduced version / All previous versions are affected
Fixed
1.0.7

Affected versions

0.*
0.1.0
0.1.2
0.1.3
0.1.4
0.1.5
0.1.6
0.1.7
0.1.8
0.1.9
0.2.0
0.2.1
0.2.2
0.3.0
0.3.1
0.3.2
0.3.4
0.3.5
0.3.6
0.3.7
0.3.8
0.4.0
0.4.1
0.4.2
0.4.3
0.4.4
0.9.0
0.9.1
0.9.2
0.9.4
0.9.5
0.9.6
0.9.7
1.*
1.0.0rc11
1.0.0
1.0.1
1.0.2
1.0.3
1.0.4
1.0.5
1.0.6

Database specific

source
"https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/blob/main/vulns/djust/PYSEC-2026-4042.yaml"