RUSTSEC-2022-0010

Source
https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2022-0010
Import Source
https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2022-0010.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/RUSTSEC-2022-0010
Aliases
Published
2022-02-17T12:00:00Z
Modified
2023-11-08T04:22:58.719670Z
Summary
enum_map macro can cause UB when `Enum` trait is incorrectly implemented
Details

Affected versions of this crate did not properly check the length of an enum when using enum_map! macro, trusting user-provided length.

When the LENGTH in the Enum trait does not match the array length in the EnumArray trait, this can result in the initialization of the enum map with uninitialized types, which in turn can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code.

This problem can only occur with a manual implementation of the Enum trait, it will never occur for enums that use #[derive(Enum)].

Example code that triggers this vulnerability looks like this:

enum E {
    A,
    B,
    C,
}

impl Enum for E {
    const LENGTH: usize = 2;

    fn from_usize(value: usize) -> E {
        match value {
            0 => E::A,
            1 => E::B,
            2 => E::C,
            _ => unimplemented!(),
        }
    }

    fn into_usize(self) -> usize {
        self as usize
    }
}

impl<V> EnumArray<V> for E {
    type Array = [V; 3];
}

let _map: EnumMap&lt;E, String> = enum_map! { _ => "Hello, world!".into() };

The flaw was corrected in commit b824e23 by putting LENGTH property on sealed trait for macro to read.

Database specific
{
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
}
References

Affected packages

crates.io / enum-map

Package

Affected ranges

Type
SEMVER
Events
Introduced
2.0.0-2
Fixed
2.0.2

Ecosystem specific

{
    "affected_functions": null,
    "affects": {
        "os": [],
        "functions": [],
        "arch": []
    }
}

Database specific

{
    "cvss": null,
    "informational": "unsound",
    "categories": [
        "code-execution",
        "memory-corruption",
        "memory-exposure"
    ]
}