RUSTSEC-2022-0072

Source
https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2022-0072
Import Source
https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2022-0072.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/RUSTSEC-2022-0072
Aliases
Published
2022-12-23T12:00:00Z
Modified
2023-11-08T04:15:57.217822Z
Summary
Location header incorporates user input, allowing open redirect
Details

When hyper-staticfile performs a redirect for a directory request (e.g. a request for /dir that redirects to /dir/), the Location header value was derived from user input (the request path), simply appending a slash. The intent was to perform an origin-relative redirect, but specific inputs allowed performing a scheme-relative redirect instead.

An attacker could craft a special URL that would appear to be for the correct domain, but immediately redirects to a malicious domain. Such a URL can benefit phishing attacks, for example an innocent looking link in an email.

Database specific
{
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
}
References

Affected packages

crates.io / hyper-staticfile

Package

Name
hyper-staticfile
View open source insights on deps.dev
Purl
pkg:cargo/hyper-staticfile

Affected ranges

Type
SEMVER
Events
Introduced
0.0.0-0
Fixed
0.9.4
Introduced
0.10.0-0
Fixed
0.10.0-alpha.5

Ecosystem specific

{
    "affected_functions": null,
    "affects": {
        "os": [],
        "functions": [],
        "arch": []
    }
}

Database specific

{
    "cvss": null,
    "informational": null,
    "categories": [
        "format-injection"
    ]
}