Versions of ed25519-dalek
prior to v2.0 model private and public keys as
separate types which can be assembled into a Keypair
, and also provide APIs
for serializing and deserializing 64-byte private/public keypairs.
Such APIs and serializations are inherently unsafe as the public key is one of
the inputs used in the deterministic computation of the S
part of the signature,
but not in the R
value. An adversary could somehow use the signing function as
an oracle that allows arbitrary public keys as input can obtain two signatures
for the same message sharing the same R
and only differ on the S
part.
Unfortunately, when this happens, one can easily extract the private key.
Revised public APIs in v2.0 of ed25519-dalek
do NOT allow a decoupled
private/public keypair as signing input, except as part of specially labeled
"hazmat" APIs which are clearly labeled as being dangerous if misused.
{ "license": "CC0-1.0" }