RUSTSEC-2022-0093

Source
https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2022-0093
Import Source
https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2022-0093.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/RUSTSEC-2022-0093
Aliases
Published
2022-06-11T12:00:00Z
Modified
2023-11-08T04:23:37.976884Z
Summary
Double Public Key Signing Function Oracle Attack on `ed25519-dalek`
Details

Versions of ed25519-dalek prior to v2.0 model private and public keys as separate types which can be assembled into a Keypair, and also provide APIs for serializing and deserializing 64-byte private/public keypairs.

Such APIs and serializations are inherently unsafe as the public key is one of the inputs used in the deterministic computation of the S part of the signature, but not in the R value. An adversary could somehow use the signing function as an oracle that allows arbitrary public keys as input can obtain two signatures for the same message sharing the same R and only differ on the S part.

Unfortunately, when this happens, one can easily extract the private key.

Revised public APIs in v2.0 of ed25519-dalek do NOT allow a decoupled private/public keypair as signing input, except as part of specially labeled "hazmat" APIs which are clearly labeled as being dangerous if misused.

Database specific
{
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
}
References

Affected packages

crates.io / ed25519-dalek

Package

Name
ed25519-dalek
View open source insights on deps.dev
Purl
pkg:cargo/ed25519-dalek

Affected ranges

Type
SEMVER
Events
Introduced
0.0.0-0
Fixed
2.0.0

Ecosystem specific

{
    "affected_functions": null,
    "affects": {
        "os": [],
        "functions": [],
        "arch": []
    }
}

Database specific

{
    "cvss": null,
    "informational": null,
    "categories": [
        "crypto-failure"
    ]
}