RUSTSEC-2023-0007

Source
https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2023-0007
Import Source
https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2023-0007.json
Aliases
Published
2023-02-07T12:00:00Z
Modified
2023-11-08T04:10:41.059156Z
Summary
Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption
Details

A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.

For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the application data sent over that connection.

References

Affected packages

crates.io / openssl-src

Package

Name
openssl-src

Affected ranges

Type
SEMVER
Events
Introduced
0.0.0-0
Fixed
111.25.0
Introduced
300.0.0
Fixed
300.0.12

Ecosystem specific 

{
    "affected_functions": null,
    "affects": {
        "os": [],
        "functions": [],
        "arch": []
    }
}

Database specific 

{
    "cvss": null,
    "informational": null,
    "categories": [
        "crypto-failure"
    ]
}