When building anonymizing circuits to or from an onion service with 'lite' vanguards (the default) enabled, the circuit manager code would build the circuits with one hop too few.
This makes users of this code more vulnerable to some kinds of traffic analysis when they run or visit onion services.
Arti configured with "vangaurds lite" is vulnerable; this is the default.
Only users who make connections to Onion Services (Tor Hidden Services) are affected. Note, however, that when used as a browser proxy, malicious web pages can typically make such connections.
Enable the "full vanguards" feature. This has some cost in terms of performance, reliability, and impact on the Tor Network.
(Arti configured with "full vanguards" has a similar bug, TROVE-2024-04, so this will not deliver the full incressed security of "full vanguards"; but the security level of affected versions of Arti configured with "full vanguards" still exceeds the intended security level of the "vanguards lite" configuration.)
Alternatively, preventing access to Tor Hidden Services will avoid the problem, with corresponding loss of functionality. This can be achieved in the Arti configuration file with:
[address_filter]
allow_onion_addrs = false
Rebuild arti
(or other affected applications)
with a fixed version of tor-circmgr
:
0.18.1 or later.
The fixed tor-circmgr
is on crates.io and available in
the upstream git repository
at signed tag arti-v1.2.3
.
Even though earlier versions are classified as "not affected", this is because in those versions the Vanguards feature is experimental, or absent. Downgrading worsens security, rather than improving it.
{ "license": "CC0-1.0" }