RUSTSEC-2026-0148

Source
https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0148
Import Source
https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0148.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/RUSTSEC-2026-0148
Aliases
Published
2026-05-16T12:00:00Z
Modified
2026-05-20T10:15:04.018246806Z
Severity
  • 10.0 (Critical) CVSS_V3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H CVSS Calculator
Summary
OCI layer symlink escape → arbitrary host write
Details

Affected versions of boxlite extract OCI image layer tarballs without fully containing path resolution to the extraction root. A crafted layer containing a symlink whose target is an absolute on-host path (e.g. escape -> /tmp) followed by a file entry that resolves through that symlink (e.g. escape/<path>/pwned.txt) caused the extractor to write the payload to the host filesystem outside the intended rootfs directory.

The fix in v0.9.0 routes every destructive filesystem operation through a SafeRoot handle (openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) on Linux, lexical fallback elsewhere) so that no tar entry can resolve outside the extraction root, even with adversarial symlinks placed by earlier entries in the same layer.

This is a container-escape during image extraction, exploitable by any user who pulls or loads a malicious OCI image — including via SimpleBox(rootfs_path=...) from an untrusted local layout.

Database specific
{
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
}
References

Affected packages

crates.io / boxlite

Package

Affected ranges

Type
SEMVER
Events
Introduced
0.0.0-0
Fixed
0.9.0

Ecosystem specific

{
    "affected_functions": null,
    "affects": {
        "arch": [],
        "functions": [],
        "os": []
    }
}

Database specific

categories
[
    "privilege-escalation",
    "file-disclosure"
]
informational
null
cvss
"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
source
"https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0148.json"