RUSTSEC-2026-0523

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Source

https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0523

Import Source

https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0523.json

JSON Data

https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/RUSTSEC-2026-0523

Aliases

GHSA-53rm-773f-4q8c

Published

2026-09-30T12:00:00Z

Modified

2026-11-13T12:45:04Z

Summary

MAX_STREAM_DATA frame can open streams beyond the stream limit

Details

When a MAX_STREAM_DATA frame named a peer-initiated bidirectional stream that was not open yet, received_max_stream_data treated the stream, and every lower-numbered stream, as opened without checking the stream ID against the limit advertised to the peer. RFC 9000 section 4.6 requires closing the connection with STREAM_LIMIT_ERROR in this case, and the STREAM and RESET_STREAM handlers already did so.

After the handshake, a peer can send one small MAX_STREAM_DATA frame naming a very large stream index, and accept then yields every stream up to that index. In quinn, a loop that keeps calling accept_bi can be handed more than 2^40 streams. Depending on the runtime, the endpoint runs out of memory, stops accepting new connections, or keeps busy indefinitely, even after the peer has gone away. Clients and servers that accept peer-initiated bidirectional streams are affected. Unidirectional streams are not.

The fix validates the stream ID in received_max_stream_data and adds a defensive check where streams are opened implicitly. It is in 0.11.19.

Database specific

{
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
}

References

Affected packages

crates.io / quinn-proto

Package

Name: quinn-proto; View open source insights on deps.dev
Purl: pkg:cargo/quinn-proto

Affected ranges

Type: SEMVER
Events: Introduced

0.11.0

Fixed

0.11.19

Ecosystem specific

{
    "affected_functions": null,
    "affects": {
        "arch": [],
        "functions": [],
        "os": []
    }
}