RUSTSEC-2026-0530

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Source

https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0530

Import Source

https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0530.json

JSON Data

https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/RUSTSEC-2026-0530

Aliases

CVE-2026-123596
GHSA-3r6v-f3jh-vvqm
RUSTSEC-2026-0539

Published

2026-09-03T12:00:00Z

Modified

2026-11-13T12:55:36Z

Summary

Parent-side NSEC at a zone cut accepted as proof of nonexistence (hickory-proto)

Details

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation accepted the NSEC record that a parent zone signs at a delegation as proof that names below the zone cut, or other types at the cut, do not exist. Such a record only proves that no DS record exists there (RFC 6840 section 4.1). Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could replay the parent's genuine signed records to get a denial for an existing name in the child zone accepted as secure.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

Database specific

{
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
}

References

Affected packages

crates.io / hickory-proto

Package

Name: hickory-proto; View open source insights on deps.dev
Purl: pkg:cargo/hickory-proto

Affected ranges

Type: SEMVER
Events: Introduced

0.0.0-0

Fixed

0.26.0-beta.1

Ecosystem specific

{
    "affected_functions": null,
    "affects": {
        "arch": [],
        "functions": [],
        "os": []
    }
}