RUSTSEC-2026-0558

Source
https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0558
Import Source
https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0558.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/RUSTSEC-2026-0558
Aliases
Published
2026-09-03T12:00:00Z
Modified
2026-11-17T10:25:38Z
Summary
Records with a DNS class other than the query's marked secure without being validated
Details

When DNSSEC validation grouped a response's records into RRsets, it did not take the DNS class into account, and records of a class other than IN were left out before signatures were checked. If the IN records validated, the records of other classes (such as CH or HS) were marked secure too.

An attacker who can answer or modify DNS responses can add forged records of another class to a response and have them returned as validated. A forged DS record of another class can also get past validation, which lets any DNSKEY for the child zone be accepted and any answer from that zone be forged. How much this matters depends on how the application treats records of an unexpected class.

This affects DNSSEC validation through DnssecDnsHandle when built with dnssec-ring or dnssec-aws-lc-rs.

The fix rejects a whole response if any record in its answer, authority or additional section has a class different from the query's.

Database specific
{
    "license":  "CC0-1.0"
}
References

Affected packages

crates.io / hickory-net

Package

Name
hickory-net
View open source insights on deps.dev
Purl
pkg:cargo/hickory-net

Affected ranges

Type
SEMVER
Events
Introduced
0.0.0-0
Fixed
0.26.2

Ecosystem specific

{
    "affected_functions":  null,
    "affects":  {
        "arch":  [],
        "functions":  [],
        "os":  []
    }
}

Database specific

categories
[
    "privilege-escalation"
]
cvss
null
informational
null
source
"https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0558.json"