In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/bugs: Use code segment selector for VERW operand
Robert Gill reported below #GP in 32-bit mode when dosemu software was executing vm86() system call:
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 4 PID: 4610 Comm: dosemu.bin Not tainted 6.6.21-gentoo-x86 #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge 1950/0H723K, BIOS 2.7.0 10/30/2010 EIP: restoreallswitchstack+0xbe/0xcf EAX: 00000000 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000 ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: 00000000 ESP: ff8affdc DS: 0000 ES: 0000 FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010046 CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00c2101c CR3: 04b6d000 CR4: 000406d0 Call Trace: showregs+0x70/0x78 dieaddr+0x29/0x70 excgeneralprotection+0x13c/0x348 excbounds+0x98/0x98 handleexception+0x14d/0x14d excbounds+0x98/0x98 restoreallswitchstack+0xbe/0xcf excbounds+0x98/0x98 restoreallswitch_stack+0xbe/0xcf
This only happens in 32-bit mode when VERW based mitigations like MDS/RFDS are enabled. This is because segment registers with an arbitrary user value can result in #GP when executing VERW. Intel SDM vol. 2C documents the following behavior for VERW instruction:
#GP(0) - If a memory operand effective address is outside the CS, DS, ES, FS, or GS segment limit.
CLEARCPUBUFFERS macro executes VERW instruction before returning to user space. Use %cs selector to reference VERW operand. This ensures VERW will not #GP for an arbitrary user %ds.
[ mingo: Fixed the SOB chain. ]