CVE-2025-38554

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm: fix a UAF when vma->mm is freed after vma->vm_refcnt got dropped

By inducing delays in the right places, Jann Horn created a reproducer for a hard to hit UAF issue that became possible after VMAs were allowed to be recycled by adding SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU to their cache.

Race description is borrowed from Jann's discovery report: lock_vma_under_rcu() looks up a VMA locklessly with mas_walk() under rcu_read_lock(). At that point, the VMA may be concurrently freed, and it can be recycled by another process. vma_start_read() then increments the vma->vm_refcnt (if it is in an acceptable range), and if this succeeds, vma_start_read() can return a recycled VMA.

In this scenario where the VMA has been recycled, lock_vma_under_rcu() will then detect the mismatching ->vm_mm pointer and drop the VMA through vma_end_read(), which calls vma_refcount_put(). vma_refcount_put() drops the refcount and then calls rcuwait_wake_up() using a copy of vma->vm_mm. This is wrong: It implicitly assumes that the caller is keeping the VMA's mm alive, but in this scenario the caller has no relation to the VMA's mm, so the rcuwait_wake_up() can cause UAF.

The diagram depicting the race: T1 T2 T3 == == == lock_vma_under_rcu mas_walk mmap vma_start_read __refcount_inc_not_zero_limited_acquire munmap __vma_enter_locked refcount_add_not_zero vma_end_read vma_refcount_put __refcount_dec_and_test rcuwait_wait_event rcuwait_wake_up [UAF]

Note that rcuwait_wait_event() in T3 does not block because refcount was already dropped by T1. At this point T3 can exit and free the mm causing UAF in T1.

To avoid this we move vma->vm_mm verification into vma_start_read() and grab vma->vm_mm to stabilize it before vma_refcount_put() operation.

[surenb@google.com: v3]