DHI-icfa-us35-najk-oji3

Source
https://scout.docker.com/v/DHI-icfa-us35-najk-oji3
Import Source
https://github.com/docker-hardened-images/advisories/blob/main/dhi/osv/2026/DHI-icfa-us35-najk-oji3.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/DHI-icfa-us35-najk-oji3
Upstream
Published
2026-11-12T23:27:05Z
Modified
2026-11-16T02:35:32Z
Severity
  • 8.6 (High) CVSS_V3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H CVSS Calculator
Summary
## Summary
Details

Summary

Dulwich's filter_branch.py CommitFilter._apply_index_filter() is vulnerable to symlink directory traversal. When processing commit history, materialized tree entries (including symlinks) persist in the working directory between commits, allowing a symlink from an ancestor commit to redirect file writes from a descendant commit to arbitrary filesystem locations.

Root Cause

_apply_index_filter() at dulwich/filter_branch.py:212 calls build_index_from_tree(".", tmp_index_path, ...) which materializes all tree entries to the current working directory. The finally block (line 229-230) only cleans up the temporary index file (os.unlink(tmp_index_path)) — NOT the filesystem files written to CWD. When process_commit() processes parents recursively first (line 260), files materialized from ancestor commits persist and affect processing of descendant commits.

On dulwich 1.2.7, build_file_from_blob() has no symlink protection, and validate_path_element only validates name patterns, not filesystem state.

Impact

An attacker can craft a malicious repository where running filter_branch with an index filter writes attacker-controlled content to arbitrary filesystem locations via symlink traversal. This achieves RCE if the write targets .git/hooks/.

Attack Scenario

  1. Attacker creates a repository where commit history (linearized) has:
    • Ancestor commit: tree entry evil (mode 120000, symlink → /target_dir)
    • Descendant commit: tree entry evil/payload (mode 100644, attacker content)
  2. Victim clones repository and runs filter_branch with an index filter
  3. process_commit() processes ancestor first → materializes evil as symlink to /target_dir in CWD
  4. CWD is NOT cleaned between commits
  5. Processing descendant: os.path.exists("./evil") → True (symlink exists). build_file_from_blob(blob, mode, "./evil/payload") → open("./evil/payload", "wb") follows intermediate symlink → writes to /target_dir/payload

Suggested Fix

Clean the CWD between commit iterations in _apply_index_filter(), or verify that no intermediate path components are symlinks before writing files.

Reported by zx (Jace)

References

Affected packages

Docker Hardened Images:Debian:13 / netbox

Package

Name
netbox
Purl
pkg:deb/dhi/netbox

Affected ranges

Affected versions

4.*
4.6.7-0
4.6.8-0
4.6.8-1
4.6.8-2
4.6.8-3
4.6.9-0
4.6.9-1
4.6.9-2
4.6.10-0
4.6.10-1
4.7.1-0
4.7.1-1
4.7.1-2
4.7.1-3
4.7.1-4
4.7.1-5
4.7.1-6
4.7.2-0
4.7.2-1
4.7.2-2
4.7.2-3
4.7.2-4
4.7.3-0
4.7.3-1
4.7.3-2
4.7.3-3
4.7.3-4
4.7.4-0
4.7.4-1
4.7.4-2
4.7.4-3
4.7.4-4
4.7.4-5
4.7.4-6
4.7.5-0
4.7.5-1

Database specific

owner_kind
"HSP"
source
"https://github.com/docker-hardened-images/advisories/blob/main/dhi/osv/2026/DHI-icfa-us35-najk-oji3.json"