A bug in the RoleBinding reflector used by capsule-proxy
gives ServiceAccount tenant owners the right to list Namespaces of other tenants backed by the same owner kind and name.
solar
, owned by a ServiceAccount named tenant-owner
in the Namespace solar
wind
, owned by a ServiceAccount named tenant-owner
in the Namespace wind
Please, notice the same ServiceAccount name, although in different namespaces.
The Tenant owner solar
would be able to list the namespaces of the Tenant wind
and vice-versa, although this is not correct.
The bug introduces an exfiltration vulnerability since allows the listing of Namespace resources of other Tenants, although just in some specific conditions:
capsule-proxy
runs with the --disable-caching=false
(default value: false
)The CVE doesn't allow any privilege escalation on the outer tenant Namespace-scoped resources, since the Kubernetes RBAC is enforcing this.
{ "nvd_published_at": "2023-11-06T19:15:09Z", "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-200" ], "severity": "MODERATE", "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-07T21:46:04Z" }