RUSTSEC-2026-0550

Source
https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0550
Import Source
https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0550.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/RUSTSEC-2026-0550
Aliases
Published
2026-09-03T12:00:00Z
Modified
2026-11-17T10:25:41Z
Summary
Unsigned NSEC or NSEC3 record used in a nonexistence proof (hickory-proto)
Details

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation kept an NSEC or NSEC3 record for a nonexistence proof if any authority record with the same owner name had validated, not only if that record itself had. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could pair a correctly signed record with a forged NSEC or NSEC3 record of the same owner name and get a forged denial accepted as secure.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

Database specific
{
    "license":  "CC0-1.0"
}
References

Affected packages

crates.io / hickory-proto

Package

Name
hickory-proto
View open source insights on deps.dev
Purl
pkg:cargo/hickory-proto

Affected ranges

Type
SEMVER
Events
Introduced
0.0.0-0
Fixed
0.26.0-beta.1

Ecosystem specific

{
    "affected_functions":  null,
    "affects":  {
        "arch":  [],
        "functions":  [],
        "os":  []
    }
}

Database specific

categories
[
    "privilege-escalation"
]
cvss
null
informational
null
source
"https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0550.json"