RUSTSEC-2026-0557

Source
https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0557
Import Source
https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0557.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/RUSTSEC-2026-0557
Aliases
Published
2026-09-03T12:00:00Z
Modified
2026-11-17T10:25:41Z
Summary
Unsigned NSEC or NSEC3 record used in a nonexistence proof when another record at the same name is signed
Details

When DNSSEC validation collected the NSEC and NSEC3 records from a response's authority section to check a denial of existence, it kept a record if any authority record with the same owner name had validated, not only if that record itself had. A response could therefore pair a correctly signed record with a forged NSEC or NSEC3 record of the same owner name, and the forged record was used in the nonexistence proof.

An attacker who can answer or modify DNS responses can use this to get a forged NXDOMAIN or NODATA answer accepted as secure.

This affects DNSSEC validation through DnssecDnsHandle when built with dnssec-ring or dnssec-aws-lc-rs.

The fix keeps an NSEC or NSEC3 record only when its own signature validated.

Database specific
{
    "license":  "CC0-1.0"
}
References

Affected packages

crates.io / hickory-net

Package

Name
hickory-net
View open source insights on deps.dev
Purl
pkg:cargo/hickory-net

Affected ranges

Type
SEMVER
Events
Introduced
0.0.0-0
Fixed
0.26.2

Ecosystem specific

{
    "affected_functions":  null,
    "affects":  {
        "arch":  [],
        "functions":  [],
        "os":  []
    }
}

Database specific

categories
[
    "privilege-escalation"
]
cvss
null
informational
null
source
"https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0557.json"