CVE-2024-44935

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sctp: Fix null-ptr-deref in reuseportaddsock().

syzbot reported a null-ptr-deref while accessing sk2->skreuseportcb in reuseportaddsock(). [0]

The repro first creates a listener with SO_REUSEPORT. Then, it creates another listener on the same port and concurrently closes the first listener.

The second listen() calls reuseportaddsock() with the first listener as sk2, where sk2->skreuseportcb is not expected to be cleared concurrently, but the close() does clear it by reuseportdetachsock().

The problem is SCTP does not properly synchronise reuseportalloc(), reuseportaddsock(), and reuseportdetach_sock().

The caller of reuseportalloc() and reuseport{add,detach}_sock() must provide synchronisation for sockets that are classified into the same reuseport group.

Otherwise, such sockets form multiple identical reuseport groups, and all groups except one would be silently dead.

1. Two sockets call listen() concurrently
2. No socket in the same group found in sctpephashtable[]
3. Two sockets call reuseport_alloc() and form two reuseport groups
4. Only one group hit first in _sctprcvlookupendpoint() receives incoming packets

Also, the reported null-ptr-deref could occur.

TCP/UDP guarantees that would not happen by holding the hash bucket lock.

Let's apply the locking strategy to _sctphashendpoint() and _sctpunhashendpoint().

KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 10230 Comm: syz-executor119 Not tainted 6.10.0-syzkaller-12585-g301927d2d2eb #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/27/2024 RIP: 0010:reuseportaddsock+0x27e/0x5e0 net/core/sockreuseport.c:350 Code: 00 0f b7 5d 00 bf 01 00 00 00 89 de e8 1b a4 ff f7 83 fb 01 0f 85 a3 01 00 00 e8 6d a0 ff f7 49 8d 7e 12 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 28 84 c0 0f 85 4b 02 00 00 41 0f b7 5e 12 49 8d 7e 14 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b947c98 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff8880252ddf98 RCX: ffff888079478000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000012 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffff8993e18d R09: 1ffffffff1fef385 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1fef386 R12: ffff8880252ddac0 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f24e45b96c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ffcced5f7b8 CR3: 00000000241be000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> _sctphashendpoint net/sctp/input.c:762 [inline] sctphashendpoint+0x52a/0x600 net/sctp/input.c:790 sctplistenstart net/sctp/socket.c:8570 [inline] sctpinetlisten+0x767/0xa20 net/sctp/socket.c:8625 _syslistensocket net/socket.c:1883 [inline] _syslisten+0x1b7/0x230 net/socket.c:1894 _dosyslisten net/socket.c:1902 [inline] _sesyslisten net/socket.c:1900 [inline] _x64syslisten+0x5a/0x70 net/socket.c:1900 dosyscallx64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] dosyscall64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entrySYSCALL64afterhwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f24e46039b9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 91 1a 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f24e45b9228 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000032 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f24e468e428 RCX: 00007f24e46039b9 RDX: 00007f24e46039b9 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f24e468e420 R08: 00007f24e45b96c0 R09: 00007f24e45b96c0 R10: 00007f24e45b96c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f24e468e42c R13: ---truncated---