In runc 1.1.11 and earlier, due to an internal file descriptor leak, an attacker could cause a newly-spawned container process (from runc exec
) to have a working directory in the host filesystem namespace, allowing for a container escape by giving access to the host filesystem ("attack 2"). The same attack could be used by a malicious image to allow a container process to gain access to the host filesystem through runc run
("attack 1"). Variants of attacks 1 and 2 could be also be used to overwrite semi-arbitrary host binaries, allowing for complete container escapes ("attack 3a" and "attack 3b").
Strictly speaking, while attack 3a is the most severe from a CVSS perspective, attacks 2 and 3b are arguably more dangerous in practice because they allow for a breakout from inside a container as opposed to requiring a user execute a malicious image. The reason attacks 1 and 3a are scored higher is because being able to socially engineer users is treated as a given for UI:R vectors, despite attacks 2 and 3b requiring far more minimal user interaction (just reasonable runc exec
operations on a container the attacker has access to). In any case, all four attacks can lead to full control of the host system.
process.cwd
"mis-configuration"In runc 1.1.11 and earlier, several file descriptors were inadvertently leaked internally within runc into runc init
, including a handle to the host's /sys/fs/cgroup
(this leak was added in v1.0.0-rc93). If the container was configured to have process.cwd
set to /proc/self/fd/7/
(the actual fd can change depending on file opening order in runc
), the resulting pid1 process will have a working directory in the host mount namespace and thus the spawned process can access the entire host filesystem. This alone is not an exploit against runc, however a malicious image could make any innocuous-looking non-/
path a symlink to /proc/self/fd/7/
and thus trick a user into starting a container whose binary has access to the host filesystem.
Furthermore, prior to runc 1.1.12, runc also did not verify that the final working directory was inside the container's mount namespace after calling chdir(2)
(as we have already joined the container namespace, it was incorrectly assumed there would be no way to chdir outside the container after pivot_root(2)
).
The CVSS score for this attack is CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N (8.2, high severity).
Note that this attack requires a privileged user to be tricked into running a malicious container image. It should be noted that when using higher-level runtimes (such as Docker or Kubernetes), this exploit can be considered critical as it can be done remotely by anyone with the rights to start a container image (and can be exploited from within Dockerfiles using ONBUILD
in the case of Docker).
runc exec
container breakout(This is a modification of attack 1, constructed to allow for a process inside a container to break out.)
The same fd leak and lack of verification of the working directory in attack 1 also apply to runc exec
. If a malicious process inside the container knows that some administrative process will call runc exec
with the --cwd
argument and a given path, in most cases they can replace that path with a symlink to /proc/self/fd/7/
. Once the container process has executed the container binary, PR_SET_DUMPABLE
protections no longer apply and the attacker can open /proc/$exec_pid/cwd
to get access to the host filesystem.
runc exec
defaults to a cwd of /
(which cannot be replaced with a symlink), so this attack depends on the attacker getting a user (or some administrative process) to use --cwd
and figuring out what path the target working directory is. Note that if the target working directory is a parent of the program binary being executed, the attacker might be unable to replace the path with a symlink (the execve
will fail in most cases, unless the host filesystem layout specifically matches the container layout in specific ways and the attacker knows which binary the runc exec
is executing).
The CVSS score for this attack is CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N (7.2, high severity).
process.args
host binary overwrite attack(These are modifications of attacks 1 and 2, constructed to overwrite a host binary by using execve
to bring a magic-link reference into the container.)
Attacks 1 and 2 can be adapted to overwrite a host binary by using a path like /proc/self/fd/7/../../../bin/bash
as the process.args
binary argument, causing a host binary to be executed by a container process. The /proc/$pid/exe
handle can then be used to overwrite the host binary, as seen in CVE-2019-5736 (note that the same #!
trick can be used to avoid detection as an attacker). As the overwritten binary could be something like /bin/bash
, as soon as a privileged user executes the target binary on the host, the attacker can pivot to gain full access to the host.
For the purposes of CVSS scoring:
/proc/self/fd/7/../../../bin/bash
and run a shell script that overwrites /proc/self/exe
, overwriting the host copy of /bin/bash
. The CVSS score for this attack is CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H (8.6, high severity).runc exec
target binaries inside the container (such as /bin/bash
) such that a host target binary is executed and then the container process opens /proc/$pid/exe
to get access to the host binary and overwrite it. The CVSS score for this attack is CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H (8.2, high severity).As mentioned in attack 1, while 3b is scored lower it is more dangerous in practice as it doesn't require a user to run a malicious image.
runc 1.1.12 has been released, and includes patches for this issue. Note that there are four separate fixes applied:
os.Getwd
returns ENOENT
(Linux provides a way of detecting if cwd is outside the current namespace root). This explicitly blocks runc from executing a container process when inside a non-container path and thus eliminates attacks 1 and 2 even in the case of fd leaks.runc init
, right before execve
. This ensures that internal file descriptors cannot be used as an argument to execve
and thus eliminates attacks 3a and 3b, even in the case of fd leaks. This requires hooking into some Go runtime internals to make sure we don't close critical Go internal file descriptors./sys/fs/cgroup
as O_CLOEXEC
and backport a fix for some *os.File
leaks).runc init
file descriptor leaks, mark all non-stdio files as O_CLOEXEC
before executing runc init
.We have discovered that several other container runtimes are either potentially vulnerable to similar attacks, or do not have sufficient protection against attacks of this nature. We recommend other container runtime authors look at our patches and make sure they at least add a getcwd() != ENOENT
check as well as consider whether close_range(3, UINT_MAX, CLOSE_RANGE_CLOEXEC)
before executing their equivalent of runc init
is appropriate.
runc init
-equivalent process (so this attack is not exploitable as far as we can tell), but no care is taken to make sure all non-stdio files are O_CLOEXEC
and there is no check after chdir(2)
to ensure the working directory is inside the container. If a file descriptor happened to be leaked in the future, this could be exploitable. In addition, any file descriptors passed to crun
are not closed until the container process is executed, meaning that easily-overlooked programming errors by users of crun
can lead to these attacks becoming exploitable.runc init
-equivalent process (so this attack is not exploitable as far as we can tell) however this appears to be pure luck. youki
does leak a directory file descriptor from the host mount namespace, but it just so happens that the directory is the rootfs of the container (which then gets pivot_root
'd into and so ends up as a in-root path thanks to chroot_fs_refs
). In addition, no care is taken to make sure all non-stdio files are O_CLOEXEC
and there is no check after chdir(2)
to ensure the working directory is inside the container. If a file descriptor happened to be leaked in the future, this could be exploitable. In addition, any file descriptors passed to youki
are not closed until the container process is executed, meaning that easily-overlooked programming errors by users of youki
can lead to these attacks becoming exploitable.lxc-attach
. However, they don't seem to have any proactive protection against file descriptor leaks at the point of chdir
such as using close_range(...)
(they do have RAII-like __do_fclose
closers but those don't necessarily stop all leaks in this context) nor do they have any check after chdir(2)
to ensure the working directory is inside the container. Unfortunately it seems they cannot use CLOSE_RANGE_CLOEXEC
because they don't need to re-exec themselves.For attacks 1 and 2, only permit containers (and runc exec
) to use a process.cwd
of /
. It is not possible for /
to be replaced with a symlink (the path is resolved from within the container's mount namespace, and you cannot change the root of a mount namespace or an fs root to a symlink).
For attacks 1 and 3a, only permit users to run trusted images.
For attack 3b, there is no practical workaround other than never using runc exec
because any binary you try to execute with runc exec
could end up being a malicious binary target.
Thanks to Rory McNamara from Snyk for discovering and disclosing the original vulnerability (attack 1) to Docker, @lifubang from acmcoder for discovering how to adapt the attack to overwrite host binaries (attack 3a), and Aleksa Sarai from SUSE for discovering how to adapt the attacks to work as container breakouts using runc exec
(attacks 2 and 3b).
{ "nvd_published_at": "2024-01-31T22:15:53Z", "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-403", "CWE-668" ], "severity": "HIGH", "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2024-01-31T22:44:08Z" }