In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fsdax: daxunshareiter needs to copy entire blocks
The code that copies data from srcmap to iomap in daxunshareiter is very very broken, which bfoster's recent fsx changes have exposed.
If the pos and len passed to daxfileunshare are not aligned to an fsblock boundary, the iter pos and length in the _iter function will reflect this unalignment.
daxiomapdirect_access always returns a pointer to the start of the kmapped fsdax page, even if its pos argument is in the middle of that page. This is catastrophic for data integrity when iter->pos is not aligned to a page, because daddr/saddr do not point to the same byte in the file as iter->pos. Hence we corrupt user data by copying it to the wrong place.
If iter->pos + iomap_length() in the _iter function not aligned to a page, then we fail to copy a full block, and only partially populate the destination block. This is catastrophic for data confidentiality because we expose stale pmem contents.
Fix both of these issues by aligning copypos/copylen to a page boundary (remember, this is fsdax so 1 fsblock == 1 base page) so that we always copy full blocks.
We're not done yet -- there's no call to invalidateinodepages2_range, so programs that have the file range mmap'd will continue accessing the old memory mapping after the file metadata updates have completed.
Be careful with the return value -- if the unshare succeeds, we still need to return the number of bytes that the iomap iter thinks we're operating on.